Contra SSPX

Before getting into a discussion regarding the canonical status of the SSPX, I think a brief overview of its origins and development is in order. The SSPX was formally erected as a provisional pious union on November 1^st, 1970 by Bishop François Charrière, which is equivalent to today’s association of the faithful. The SSPX lost its juridic status on May 6^th, 1975 after Charrière’s successor, Bishop Pierre Mamie, suppressed the society in response to Marcel Lefebvre’s 1974 declaration,[1] which essentially accuses the Second Vatican Council of heresy. According to canonist Fr. John Lessard-Thibodeau,

 

The juridic personality the SSPX gained upon its erection 01 November 1970 was lost on 06 May 1975 when it was suppressed [cf. canon 120.1 of the 1983 CIC]. Consequently lacking juridic personality, the SSPX does not exist juridically and thus has no canonical status. Since a juridic person comes into existence either de iure or by decree of competent authority (c. 114), the mere fact that the SSPX has cohesion and self-declared leadership does not constitute them as a juridic person. As such, the SSPX is de facto an organized consortium of Catholics, but it is not de iure a Catholic organization.[2]

 

On July 22^nd of 1976,[3] Lefebvre incurred the penalty of suspension a divinis after the ordination of several priests and deacons on June 29^th of the same year.[4] On June 30^th, 1988 Marcel Lefebvre proceeded with the consecration of four bishops, despite receiving several warnings beforehand. As a result, he incurred a latae sententiae excommunication alongside those who he consecrated.

 

Prior to the promulgation of the 1983 Code of Canon Law, canon 953 of the 1917 CIC required the approval of the Roman Pontiff for episcopal consecrations. Canon 2370 also inflicted the penalty of suspension ipso jure (by the law itself) on those who consecrated bishops without papal approval. Additionally, those who received ordination from excommunicated bishops incurred ipso facto suspension reserved to the Holy See. Canon 2372 of the 1917 CIC states:

Those who receive orders from one who is excommunicated, suspended, or interdicted by a declaratory or condemnatory sentence, or from a notorious apostate, heretic, or schismatic, contract ipso facto a suspension a divinis reserved to the Apostolic See. Be he who in good faith is ordained by any of the above mentioned persons lacks the exercise of the order so received until he is dispensed.

 

On April 9^th, 1951 the Holy Office changed the censure to a latae sententiae excommunication reserved specially to the Holy See.

A bishop of any rite or dignity whatever who confers episcopal consecration on a cleric who has not been nominated by the Holy See, or expressly confirmed by the same, and also the person who received such consecration, even if impelled by grave fear, are subject ipso facto to excommunication reserved specialissimo modo to the Holy See.

 

Theologians usually distinguish between two kinds of schism: pure and mixed schism. Schism is defined by Canon 1325, §2 of the 1917 CIC as the refusal to be subject to the Roman Pontiff or be in communion with members of the Church subject to him. Mixed schism entails a combination of both heresy and schism. The case of the SSPX is unique since they don’t profess any heresy; although an argument can be made that some of their positions are rash or even proximate to heresy.

 

Members of the SSPX usually try to avert the accusation of schism by claiming that they accept the authority of the Roman Pontiff and submit to his legitimate doctrinal and disciplinary decrees. They will simply argue that they are morally bound to recognize and resist heresy and the abuse of authority. In this particular case, they accuse the Second Vatican Council of teaching heresy, and Paul VI of acting outside his legitimate authority in the promulgation of the Novus Ordo Missae. Although not strictly defined, dogmatic theologian Joseph Pohle gives the theological note of “certa” to the thesis that the Church has authority to institute entirely new liturgical rites.[5] Theologians usually assign the censure of “rash” to the contradictory position.[6]  

 

Likewise, the implicit accusation that the entire college of bishops, with the exception of a few, could fall into or be suspect of heresy is proximate to heresy since it implicitly denies the indefectibility of the Episcopal college. That the entire body of bishops cannot be suspect of heresy is required by the formal visibility of the Church, which states that the Church instituted by Christ must express the four marks in such a way as to give one moral certainty that this is the true Church of Christ. One of the four marks is apostolicity which can be subdivided into apostolicity of doctrine and government. One cannot reasonably conclude that the Church has retained apostolicity of doctrine if the entire body of bishops adheres at least implicitly through its union with the Pope to heretical doctrine.

 

            In any event, the sheer fact that one claims adherence to the Papal office and magisterium doesn’t excuse one from the delict of schism. One may also be a schismatic indirectly by his actions. As canonist Fr. Ignatius Szal notes,

 

 

Strictly considered, a schismatic professes belief in the sovereign power and primacy of the Pope, but out of malice refuses to be subject to him and to obey him as the Head of the Church and the Vicar of Christ on earth. Such schism is called pure schism.

 

To constitute the delict of schism in the strict sense, the following conditions are required:

 

1) One must withdraw directly (expressly) or indirectly (by means of one’s actions) from obedience to the Roman Pontiff, and separate oneself from ecclesiastical communion with the rest of the faithful, even though one does not join a separate schismatical sect;

 

2) one’s withdrawal must be made with obstinacy and rebellion;

 

3) the withdrawal must be made in relation to those things by which the unity of the Church is constituted; and

 

4) despite this formal disobedience the schismatic must recognize the Roman Pontiff as the true pastor of the Church, and he must profess as an article of faith that obedience is due the Roman Pontiff.[7]

 

The consecration of bishops in direct defiance of papal orders is per se a schismatic act, since it entails the creation of another magisterium. The schismatic nature of Lefebvre’s 1988 consecrations was noted by John Paul II in his letter to Lefebvre. JP II writes,

 

 

With a paternal heart, but with all the gravity required by the present circumstances, I exhort you, Reverend Brother, not to embark upon a course which, if persisted in, cannot but appear as a schismatical act whose inevitable theological and canonical consequences are known to you. I earnestly invite you to return, in humility, to full obedience to Christ’s Vicar.[8]

 

            Although the excommunications were lifted in 2009 by Pope Benedict XVI, that doesn’t negate the schismatic nature of Lefebvre’s actions, or the continued ordination of SSPX priests. All of the SSPX clergy remain suspended a divinis without any legitimate ministry in the Church. Members of the SSPX also continue refuse to be subject to their local bishops in disciplinary matters, as well as refuse to commune with fellow Catholics in the ordinary form of the Mass. In conclusion, we have legitimate grounds for assuming that the SSPX is schismatic properly speaking and not merely disobedient.

 

The SSPX usually appeal to the principle of epikeia to argue in favor for the 1988 consecrations and the continued ordination of priests. This principle essentially states that when the law of the Church becomes harmful to the public welfare, those laws no longer remain binding (at least temporarily). As canonists John Abbo and Jerome Hannan note,

 

A law ceases to exist when it ceases to be reasonable; for then its whole purpose of promoting the welfare of the community is defeated. This occurs in two ways: when the law becomes useless (negatively) and when the law becomes harmful (positively). In both ways, law ceases intrinsically. If not the whole purpose, but only the partial purpose of the law is defeated, the law survives. Moreover, even though the purpose of the law should cease absolutely but only in respect to certain provisions of the law, the latter would survive as to those portions still motivated by an adequate purpose.[9]

 

However, their appeal to epikeia would only be justifed if the SSPX could demonstrate that the Novus Ordo Missae was illicitly promulgated. To establish this point, adherents of the SSPX argue that the promulgation of the Novus Ordo Missae by Paul VI is in direct violation of canon 13 of the seventh session of Trent and the apostolic constitution Quo Primum of Pius V.

 

1.      Canon 13 of the Seventh Session of Trent

 

The most common objection raised against the liceity of the Novus Ordo Missae is based on the 13^th canon of the seventh session of Trent, which forbids pastors from tampering with the ceremonies surrounding the sacraments. The canon reads:

 

If anyone says that the received and approved rites of the Catholic Church, accustomed to be used in the administration of the sacraments, may be despised or omitted by the ministers without sin and at their pleasure, or may be changed by any pastor of the churches to other new ones, let him be anathema.[10]

 

There are generally two arguments adduced from this canon: (1) the term “pastor” extends to the pope; and (2) that the Church does not have the authority to institute entirely new liturgical rites surrounding the Eucharist. I will address the second objection first. The term “rites” refers to all the ceremonies surrounding the Sacraments, not merely the Eucharist. This is evident from John Calvin’s Antidote,

 

What they mean by the received and approved Rites of the Church every one is aware. Hence by this caveat they establish whatever superstitions human presumption has superinduced on the pure ordinances of the Lord. The genuine rite of Baptism is simple, and the administration of the Supper simple, if we look to what the Lord has enjoined.

 

In other words, the term “rites” in the 13^th canon is equivalent to the more generic term “sacramentals.” No Catholic, of course, would deny that the Church has authority to institute entirely new sacramentals. Such would be in violation of canon 1145 of the 1917 CIC. In his commentary on canon 1145, Fr. Charles Augustine notes,

 

The Apostolic See alone can institute Sacramentals, authentically interpret those in use, or abolish or change some of them. This is not a dogma, as the Council of Trent has not defined this power directly, but only negatively determined that the rites accompanying the administration of the Sacraments may not be arbitrarily condemned, omitted, or changed. Our text claims the exclusive power of instituting Sacramentals for the Holy See. This is not surprising if we remember the general saying: Lex orandi, lex credendi. The Sacramentals are the living expression of the faith and hope that is in the Church. However, this does not mean that no Sacramentals were instituted without the concurrence of the Apostolic See. For more than one of them, especially the rites surrounding the administration of Baptism, are undoubtedly of Apostolic origin. This explains why the Holy See has consistently refused to depart from such practices as anointings, spittle, breathing, even among nations who were opposed to these rites. The legislative and ministerial power of the Church alone can declare which rites by their external sign signify the blessing or favor that God wishes to bestow.[11]

               Dogmatic theologian Fr. Joseph Pohle also understands the term “rites” in the 13th canon to refer to sacramentals. He writes, 

Thesis IV: Though the Church has no right to institute Sacraments, she possesses the power to institute sacramentals.

 

This proposition may be qualified as "certa"

 

Proof. In the three preceding theses we have explained what the Church cannot do in regard to the Sacraments. The present one defines what she can do.

 

There are two kinds of sacramentals: (1) such as accompany the administration of the Sacraments (e. g. the exorcisms pronounced in Baptism, the use of salt, the anointing of the forehead), and (2) such as may be used independently of the Sacraments and have a quasi matter and form of their own (e. g. the different ecclesiastical blessings). The former are called sacramental ceremonies, the latter sacramentals in the strict sense of the term.

 

1. That the Church has power to institute sacramental ceremonies or rites, is clear from the following declaration of the Tridentine Council: "If anyone saith that the received and approved rites of the Catholic Church, wont to be used in the solemn administration of the Sacraments, may be contemned, or without sin be omitted at pleasure by the ministers, or be changed by every pastor of the churches into other new ones, let him be anathema."

 

a) In proof of this dogma the Holy Synod adduces the example of St. Paul, who concludes his remarks on the Eucharist with these words: "And the rest I will set in order, when I come." There is abundant Patristic evidence for the antiquity of the sacramental ceremonies employed by the Church. Most of those now in use can be traced far beyond the ninth century, as a glance at the Sacramentary of Gregory the Great and the writings of Rhabanus Maurus, Alcuin, and Isidore shows. In the early days of Christianity different ceremonies were in vogue, as may be gathered from the works of Tertullian.

 

The theological argument for our thesis rests mainly on the fact that the Church possesses legislative power to ordain whatever she judges fit to beautify her services and promote the salvation of souls. The sacramental ceremonies serve both these purposes by giving visible expression to the ideas that underlie the sacred mysteries of religion, and by stimulating, nourishing, and augmenting the devotion of the faithful.[12]

 

In fact, the Council of Trent explicitly affirmed its authority to institute entirely new liturgies surrounding the Eucharist in the twenty-first session. The Council declares:

 

Chapter II: The power of the Church as regards the dispensation of the Sacrament of the Eucharist.

It furthermore declares, that this power has ever been in the Church, that, in the dispensation of the sacraments, their substance being untouched, it may ordain, or change, what things soever it may judge most expedient, for the profit of those who receive, or for the veneration of the said sacraments, according to the difference of circumstances, times, and places.

 

            The phrase “substance being untouched” refers to the sacramental form of the Eucharist. This is evident from the Catechism of Trent’s statement,

 

The form to be used (in the consecration) of this element, evidently consists of those words which signify that the substance of the wine is changed into the blood of our Lord. Since, therefore, the words already cited clearly declare this, it is plain that no other words constitute the form.

 

This also undermines the first objection regarding the term “pastors” applying to the pope.  Clearly, canon 13 was forbidding local priests and bishops from tampering with the liturgical ceremonies surrounding the sacraments. It nowhere denies the Supreme Pontiff from doing so. To properly interpret the 13^th canon we need to understand its historical context and purpose. According to late 19^th century theologian Fr. John Hogan (1829 – 1901), the 13^th canon was issued by the Council to address protestant objections concerning the Church’s authority not only in instituting new liturgical rites but also its ability to bind consciences in liturgical matters. He writes,

 

Protestantism, as we know, was a revolt against the whole organization and outward life of the Church. Her sacramental rites were almost entirely thrust aside, with their underlying doctrines, by the first so called reformers; and in what they retained of them, the instructive and beautiful ceremonial of Christian ages gave way to a cold and lifeless ritual. It was in opposition to this that the Council of Trent formulated the 13th Canon of its 7th Session.[13]

 

Fr. James O'Kane’s (1825 – 1874) adds, “It is evident that to maintain the proposition condemned by the canon of Trent would be implicitly to maintain that the Church has not power to institute ceremonies or require their observance under pain of sin, which is an error in faith.”[14] For anyone that disputes this point, I submit to you none other than the interpretation of St. Robert Bellarmine. He writes,

 

The Ceremonies instituted by the Church cannot be omitted without sin, even without scandal. This depends upon another question, whether Ecclesiastical laws oblige in conscience. We disputed on that point in On the Roman Pontiff, book 4, ch. 15 et seqq. The particular reason is from Paul in Romans 13:1-2, “There is no power except from God, moreover, those things which have been ordained by God, therefore he who resists the power of God resists the ordination of God, while he that resists Him acquires damnation.” And in v. 5, “Therefore, out of necessity be subject, not only on account of wrath, but even on account of conscience.” Such a teaching, even if the Apostle applies it to princes in particular times, when he added in verse 4, “If you do badly, fear, for he carries a sword without cause;” nevertheless, the general teaching is on all those having power, as Calvin concedes in The Institutes, 4,10 § 5, and it is clear from those words in verse 1, There is no power but from God. For that very proposition is equivalent to this, All power is from God. Moreover, in the Church it cannot be denied that there is a certain power of those that have been put before others, since in Scripture it says, “He that is in charge in solicitude ( Romans 12:8), and “I write these things while I am absent so that when I am present I will not deal with you more harshly according to the power which the Lord gave to me.” (2 Corinthians 13:10). Or again, “Obey those that have been put over you.” (Hebrews 13:17). Therefore, it is effected that he that does not preserve the laws of the Church will sin in conscience. All these things show it: “They resist the ordinances of God; they acquire damnation for themselves, be subject from necessity; not only on account of wrath, but also on account of conscience.” (See loc. cit.) But in particular, that ceremonies are not all of free observance is proven from the fact that grave conflicts arose in the Church on account of ceremonies, and laws were imposed under the severest penalties in regard to ceremonies, and at length they were held as heretics who did not obey. Such are all the manifest arguments that this matter is not free: for conflicts do not come about from matters that are free.[15]

 

In the section quoted above, Bellarmine cites his treatise On the Roman Pontiff. For the sake of posterity, I will reproduce the relevant section here:

 

So far we have proven that the Supreme Pontiff is a judge of controversies which arise in the Church and that he is certain and infallible in his judgment. Now follows the third question:

Whether the Supreme Pontiff can compel the faithful to believe or do that which he has judged. The same thing is understood about other bishops, save for proportion. But before we come either to our arguments or those of our adversaries, it will be worthwhile to record a few things on the state of the question, as well as the opinion of our adversaries.

Therefore, first it must be noted that we do not speak about the Pope as a temporal prince of a certain province. In this manner, it is certain that he can impose laws on his subjects and also turn to them with the sword. The heretics do not deny this in regard to the arrangement wherein the Pope is a temporal prince, although they deny it is fitting for him to exercise such a rule. We will speak more on that matter in the next book. Therefore, now we only treat on the Pontiff as he is the Pontiff of the whole Catholic Church. Moreover, we ask whether he may have true power over all the faithful in spiritual matters just as temporal kings have in temporal affairs, to the extent that, just as they can make civil laws, so also the Pope can make ecclesiastical laws truly obliging in conscience as well as punish transgressors with spiritual penalties at least, such as excommunication, suspension, interdict, irregularity, etc. We will treat on temporal or civil power which the Pope has either directly or indirectly in the following book. At present we are only discussing the spiritual or ecclesiastical, whose end is eternal life.[16]

…

Lastly, it must be noted that the opinion that teaches there is no authority in the Church to make laws that oblige the faithful in conscience pleases many heretics. So formerly the Waldenses thought, as St. Antoninus attests. Marsilius of Padua taught the same thing in a book titled Defender of Peace, against which Albert Pighius wrote; John Wycliffe taught the same thing, from where it was gathered that the decretals of the Popes were apocryphal, and only stupid men devoted themselves to recognizing them. Jan Hus later taught the same thing, as John de Wessalia notes in a little book on his condemnation that was made at Moguntium, in 1479, the first of which was that the prelates of the Church could not make a law which obliges in conscience but could only exhort men to keep the commandments of God.

Thereafter in our own times, all Lutherans and Calvinists teach the same thing. Above all Luther in his book On the Babylonian Captivity, in the chapter on Baptism: “By what right does the Pope constitute laws over us? Who gave him the power of placing the liberty that was given to us through Baptism captive, when neither the Pope nor a bishop nor any man should have the right to constitute one syllable over a true Christian unless it were done by the consent of the same.” He teaches similar things in his book on Christian liberty, which Iodocus Clicthouseus refutes, as well as John of Rochester [Fisher] in his attack on the assertion of article 27. Yet Luther most vehemently treats it in his explication of the vision of Daniel, and that he might condemn ecclesiastical laws even by his deeds, in the year 1520 he publicly burned the whole body of canon law, as John Cochlaeus writes in the life of Luther.

Melanchthon teaches the same thing in the Augsburg Confession and in his defense of the same; so does Calvin; the opinion of all of them is nearly the same, and can be reduced to certain headings.

1) They teach that bishops and hence even the Pope can constitute a certain order in the Church to preserve useful discipline, such as to define on what day men should go to church, who should sing the Psalms and how, or the Scriptures that must be read in the Church, etc.; but still, such constitutions do not oblige in conscience, except by reason of scandal, so that one would be free to keep or not keep these laws in a manner without scandal to others. But the Pope or bishops cannot constitute any true law which is not expressly in Scripture.

2) They teach that not only can the Pope or bishops not make a new law, but neither can they compel Christians to keep the law of God by a command from authority. Even if it occurs in the form of judgment in proceeding against transgressors, still they can only resort to exhortation, advice and rebuke to make men preserve the law of God.

3) They teach that while there is a power of excommunicating in the Church (that is, of rejecting incorrigible men from the body), nevertheless, they do not mean this power is in the Pope or the bishop per se, but only in the Church, which for them means the body of ministers along with the consent of the people. This should not be a wonder, since they deny the Pope is greater than a bishop, or a bishop greater than a priest in regard to authority. Moreover, they grant nothing to priests except that they can preach and minister the Sacraments to those men over whom a secular magistrate commands.

But in the Catholic Church it has always been believed that bishops over their dioceses (as well as the Roman Pontiff over the whole Church), are true ecclesiastical princes, who can impose laws that oblige in conscience, judge in ecclesiastical cases, and at length, punish by the custom of others—all without the consensus of the people or the counsel of priests. We will briefly prove these things.[17]

 

The 13^th canon was never understood as forbidding the Supreme Pontiff from altering or creating entirely new liturgical rites. For example, St. Alphonsus Liguori notes in his History on the Council of Trent,

 

There is no doubt whether the Church has the power to establish and change the rites or ceremonies applied in the administration of the Sacraments, as the Council of Trent itself teaches (Sess. 21, cap. 2). Nevertheless, this power belongs to the Church alone, which is why it forbids any other from changing the rites, otherwise, as St. Augustine says (Epist. 54, alias 118) new things constituted by the ministers would disturb the order and the common peace of the Church.[18]

 

Likewise, Italian theologian Giovanni Perrone (1794-1876) writes,

 

This definition directly affects the power whereby the Church was instructed by Christ to institute those things which concern the administration of the Sacraments, save for their substance [i.e., form of the sacraments], precisely as this same Council declared (Sess. 21 cap. 2) saying, ‘It furthermore declares, that this power has ever been in the Church, that, in the dispensation of the sacraments, their substance being untouched, it may ordain, or change, what things soever it may judge most expedient, for the profit of those who receive, or for the veneration of the said sacraments, according to the difference of circumstances, times, and places.’ This is why, in the same way, to scorn the approved and received rites of the Church or to omit them at one’s pleasure, or to change them into new rites on one’s own private authority, is also to deny the power conferred upon the Church by Christ which, which cannot altogether be done. [Footnote 3] “(171) That the Church was equipped with this power by Christ is certain: 1) From the Apostle [Paul], in 1 Cor. 11, when he wrote many things on the Sacrament of the Eucharist, and he concludes in verse 34, ‘What remains, I will set in order when I come’.”

Footnote 3:

Here we must note both in regard to this and in regard to some other theses of this sort, so far as these are on faith, so much also they contain a fact joined with a right. A fact in the present proposition is that the rites or other ceremonies which are taken up in solemn administration of the Sacraments; certainly these are neither divinely instituted nor contained in divine revelation. Right is the power conferred upon the Church by Christ to establish rites or ceremonies of this sort; moreover, this right is certain from divine revelation. Besides, to deny, scorn or teach that these rites can be omitted without sin is at least indirectly to attack the very right which is suited to the Church by divine institution; accordingly this is against the faith.[19]

 

2.      Quo Primum

 

Neo-traditionalists also frequently cite Pius V’s apostolic constitution Quo Primum (1570) in attempt to undermine the liceity of the Novus Ordo Missae. There are generally two arguments adduced from Quo Primum: (1) Pius V explicitly states that the Roman Missal may not be changed; and (2) that suppressing immemorial customs is an injustice. Concerning the first point, Pius V writes,

 

We order and enjoin that nothing must be added to Our recently published Missal, nothing omitted from it, nor anything whatsoever be changed within it under the penalty of Our displeasure.

 

In his article, “What changes were made to the Tridentine Missal before 1962?” Fr. Aaron Williams lists several changes that were made to the Roman Missal after the promulgation of Quo Primum. He notes,

 

Though Pope Saint Pius V, in his apostolic constitution Quo Primum, promised the wrath of Saints Peter and Paul upon anyone who would attempt to change the Missale Romanum of 1570, the Tridentine Missal did in fact undergo many minor (and sometimes even major) alterations before it reached the 1962 form in use today in the Extraordinary Form of the Roman Rite.

In 1605, Pope Clement VIII recognized that in the mere thirty-five years since the publication of the Missale Romanum many editorial changes were made by independent publishers without permission, particularly in relation to certain ancient scriptural citations from the Old Latin versions. Publishers were rendering these texts according to the official Vulgate edition. Pope Clement ordered that these texts be restored to their more ancient versions. However, in 1634 Pope Urban VIII reversed this decision by ordering that scriptural texts in the Missal reflect those of the Vulgate edition. Though no rubrical changes occurred, he also ordered some rubrics be re-worded to be more understandable.

No further changes were made to the Missal itself until 1884 when Pope Leo XIII ordered a revision of the calendar. By that time, the calendar was becoming so full of feasts that many saints were being omitted entirely—being superseded by other feasts on the same day. In addition to the removal of these feasts, Leo XIII also ordered a restoration of rubrics which, though never changed in the official versions, were being altered in local printings particularly in France and the surrounding regions. Leo XIII also established the custom of the traditional ‘Prayers after Low Mass’ which, though not part of the Missal itself, were nevertheless mandatory.

In 1920, Pope Benedict XV ordered a major revision of the Breviary and a sizable alteration of the Missal, which was envisioned by Pope St. Pius X, though never initiated before his death. This revision included the addition of several feasts, and a rubrical reform of the calendar, particularly relating to the practice of seasonal commemorations and the restoration of Lenten ferial days. Other feasts were added in the 20th century including Christ the King on the last Sunday of October (1925), the elevation of the Feast of the Sacred Heart to that of a first class (1932), and the Votive Mass of Our Lord Jesus Christ, Eternal High Priest (1935).

Pope Pius XII made perhaps the most significant changes with his reform of Holy Week in 1955, but he also introduced several other feasts including the Assumption, the Immaculate Heart of Mary, and St. Joseph the Worker. Permission was also given for the usage of vernacular hymns during low Mass, and the reading of the lections in the vernacular. And, of course, in 1962, Pope St. John XXIII issued a new edition of the missal which added the name of St. Joseph to the Roman Canon and removed the term ‘perfidious’ from the Good Friday intercession for the Jews.[20]

 

It should also be noted that Pius V issued similar prohibitions against making changes to the Breviary in his papal bull, Quod a nobis (9 July 1568).[21] It not only prohibits pastors for altering the breviary, but it also suppresses all local Breviaries that were not older than two hundred years. Pius V writes, 

 

Having thus forbidden to anyone the use of any other, we order that our breviary and form of praying and chanting be kept in all churches around the world... according to the custom and rite of the Roman Church, except the aforesaid institution or custom exceeding two hundred years: stating that this breviary, at any time, may not be changed in whole or in part, except nothing whatsoever can be added to it or taken away from it...[22]

 

In his letter to Archbishop Studium Pio (August 16, 1842), Pope Gregory XVI lists the Breviary as one of the Rites of the Church. He writes,

 

Nothing would be more desirable than to see observed by all those under your care and in every place the constitutions of Saint Pius V, our Predecessor of immortal memory, who wished that no one should be dispensed from the obligation of adopting the Breviary and the Missal published, according to the mind of the Council of Trent for the use of the Roman Rite, except those who for over two centuries had used a different Breviary or Missal.

 

a)      Immemorial Custom

 

In his apostolic constitution Quo Primum, Pius V permits the usage of liturgies older than 200 years. He writes,

 

This new rite alone is to be used unless approval of the practice of saying Mass differently was given at the very time of the institution and confirmation of the church by Apostolic See at least 200 years ago, or unless there has prevailed a custom of a similar kind which has been continuously followed for a period of not less than 200 years, in which most cases We in no wise rescind their above-mentioned prerogative or custom. However, if this Missal, which we have seen fit to publish, be more agreeable to these latter, We grant them permission to celebrate Mass according to its rite, provided they have the consent of their bishop or prelate or of their whole Chapter, everything else to the contrary notwithstanding.

 

Canon 30 of the 1917 CIC distinguishes three kinds of customs: particular, centenary and immemorial. Particular customs are those which have been observed for at least thirty years, centenary customs are those which have been observed for at least one hundred years, and immemorial customs are those which have been observed for as long as anyone in the community can remember. Some argue that the suppression of immemorial customs (in this case the Usus Antiquior) is an injustice against the patrimony of the Church. There is a twofold problem with this argument.

 

First, in his article, “Immemorial Custom and the Missale Romanum of 1962,” Fr. Anselm Gribbin argues that once an immemorial custom has become a universal law it no longer retains the force of custom. Second, even if the Usus Antiquior did retain the force of custom, there is nothing preventing the Church from abrogating it. Canon 5 of the 1917 CIC explicitly states that the Church may revoke even universal and immemorial customs. The canon reads:

 

Customs presently in force, whether universal or particular, but against the prescriptions of these canons, if they are indeed expressly reprobated, are to be corrected as a corruption of the law, even if they are immemorial, nor are they permitted to revive in the future; other customs, clearly centenary or immemorial, can be tolerated if Ordinaries determine that, due to circumstances of person or place, they cannot be prudently removed; other customs are considered suppressed, unless the Code expressly provides otherwise.

            That being said, Paul VI never thought he was replacing the Old Roman Rite with an entirely new one.  In his correspondence with Jean Guitton, Paul VI wrote, “I have kept the canon of St. Pius V in the four canons of the new liturgy, where it holds the first place.”[23] Although it can be credibly argued that the revision of the Latin rite under Paul VI is so extensive that it effectively creates a new rite in all but name, while suppressing one of the ancient rites of the Church. Even on that assumption, I see no basis for denying that it is within the competence of the supreme authority to establish new liturgical forms, as none of the ancient forms as we know them date to apostolic times. For example, according to some estimates the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom is 80% new from the Liturgy of St. James; whereas the Maronite rite, which owes a lot to the Liturgy of St. James, is basically a new rite created in the 8^th century. No one would argue, however, that these rites are illicit on the basis that they differ radically from their liturgical predecessors. Although there’s a strong case that it is a great loss to suppress one of the ancient liturgies for any reason, but it would be much more difficult to prove that the Church has no authority to do so. After all, there are undoubtedly many local ancient liturgies that have been lost to history, being replaced the Byzantine and Roman rites. In any event, Pope Benedict XVI declared that the old form of the Latin rite should not be suppressed; indeed that it was never suppressed.

 

In his correspondence with Paul VI, Jean Guitton noted that the primary issue with the new missal was not the canons but the offertory.  Neo-traditionalists argue that the changes made to the offertory essentially entails a rejection of the sacrificial dimension of the Mass. Ratzinger notes, however, that the “sacrificial dimension was never located in the Offertory, but in the Eucharistic Prayer, the Canon.”[24] He continues by addressing the etymology of the term “Offertory,” which is derived from the Latin offerre. As Ratzinger notes, “offerre” does not mean to sacrifice but rather to prepare. The idea was simply that the altar had to be prepared for the Eucharist. This was seen as an external preparation for what was to take place.

 

There have been many scholars and theologians that have commented on Vatican II’s decree on religious liberty. Neo-traditionalists argue that there exists a formal contradiction between Pacem in Terris and Dignitatis Humanae with previous magisterial teaching, which supposedly denied the right to religious freedom. However, in the words of E. William Stokey, “It is the earlier teaching, rather than the more recent teaching, which is in need of careful qualification.”[25] In paragraph 14 of Pacem in Terris, John XXIII taught,

 

Also among man's rights is that of being able to worship God in accordance with the right dictates of his own conscience, and to profess his religion both in private and in public. According to the clear teaching of Lactantius, “this is the very condition of our birth, that we render to the God who made us that just homage which is His due; that we acknowledge Him alone as God, and follow Him. It is from this ligature of piety, which binds us and joins us to God, that religion derives its name.'' 

 

Although there is nothing definitively taught in Pacem in Terris, I find its teaching on religious liberty uncontroversial, since it is rooted in two principles taught by Aquinas himself, viz. – freedom of conscience[26] and the objective duty to worship God.[27] According to Thomistic scholar Fr. Dominic Legge,

 

Aquinas never considers law, nor justice, nor ius (the object of justice), as belonging to an individual person abstracted from a wider teleological order. Rather, a subjective ius or right is, for Aquinas, always a way of looking at how an individual belongs to a larger order and is himself teleologically ordered, according to reason, to a good.

This is true even of the right to worship God according to one’s conscience, which belongs to individuals who have the use of reason and free choice. For Aquinas, this right does not belong to them as pure or absolute individuals, abstracted from the wider order in which man exists. Rather, that subjective right is itself another way of expressing how man is ordered to God.[28]

 

            He continues,

 

On this view, then, individual rights are not set over against the common good, as if an increase in the common good necessitated a diminishment of individual liberty. Rather, that individuals be secure in their liberties as citizens—that they “possess rights”—is precisely an aspect or dimension of the common good, and the protection of those rights in law is a means for securing the common good of a just republic. In all of this, subjective rights are understood as a function of an overarching order toward a good. To put it another way, rights are important (or even fundamental and indispensable) precisely because of the overarching primacy of the common good and the place that each individual has in the order of the whole.[29]

…

I would like to answer by summarizing the essentials of what I take to be Thomas’s position. The ius, or what is due to another, the object of justice, depends, first, on the overarching order of the cosmos, which is laid out according to God’s wisdom, and is therefore both intelligible and teleological, and which is composed of persons endowed with reason and free choice who are members of various communities that are themselves arranged in hierarchical order. Then, second, this ius is a function of the relationality that follows from the place that these persons have in this order. Nor is this order an abstraction: it is the concrete, particular, historical order in which I find myself. Man comes into the world as the child of parents, living in a human community, as a creature under God. He has not himself created or generated this order. Consequently, man necessarily and inevitably exists in an interlocking web of relationships, of belonging as a part to other wholes: his family, his clan, his city, the whole human race, the whole body of Christ, the whole of creation. These relationships are not constituted by man’s choice. Rather, we could say that man is naturally and originally in these relationships.

 

Aquinas’s understanding of justice, and thus of rights, is therefore quite different from the Enlightenment and post Enlightenment accounts derived from social contract theory, which postulate that man exists first as a kind of independent individual in a primitive “state of nature,” and therefore brings to the relationships he chooses to enter certain fundamental rights that are, in a sense, anterior to those relationships. Such theories, whether we are speaking of Hobbes, Locke, or more recent authors like John Rawls, tend to abstract from the concrete historical relationships and, we might say, the initial conditions into which we are in fact born. They aim at developing an account of the basic or fundamental rights that human beings have purely in virtue of being human, such that justice becomes, at least in part, granting what is due in virtue of those rights, and so that individuals can then pursue whatever goods they deem worthy of their choice.

 

For Aquinas, in contrast, the ultimate end of man is not a matter of arbitrary choice, not even for God. Thee whole plan of divine providence originates in God’s wisdom as an ordination of reason with respect to the good. And so, we are born into the world as creatures who naturally occupy a place in that order, and who are naturally ordered to a final end, a good, that we do not choose. Neither are our relationships matters of choice; we simply are in certain relationships: familial relations, relations with our neighbors, membership in a larger political and civic community, and so on. Justice thus has to do with our right ordering to the good that we do not determine for ourselves. It is based on a reality outside of us, in the order of relations in which we inevitably exist.

 

For a Thomist, then, rights are not properties of individuals as moral monads. Nor can we find the source of rights in an abstract definition of human nature, but rather by considering man as a rational and free creature ordered to God and to the common good of the hierarchy of communities to which he belongs. This allows us to see, then, how rights are connected to justice, to teleology, and to the common good.

 

In relation to Justice: Rights are a way of looking at what is due, the ius or iustum, insofar as it is due to someone who can then seek to have that “due” vindicated. This is, in Thomistic terms, a “right.” Because of man’s nature, we can draw certain conclusions about what man is, what man ought to be, and therefore how we should treat other persons, since they are equal to us insofar as they are human. Yet rights are not functions of individuals as individuals, but rather of persons who belong in a hierarchy of ordered wholes (families, cities, the whole human race, the whole cosmos), each of which has its own common good.

 

In relation to Teleology and the Common Good: Law is teleological. It is always ordered to the common good, either real or merely apparent. And rights are likewise teleological: they arm what is required for persons to be rightly ordered to each other and to the political authority in view of the common good. us, to respect the rights of another, to give hi m what is due to him, not only pertains to his private good, but means acting in right relationship to the order of the whole, to the common good.

 

Indeed, Aquinas teaches that man’s ends are not arranged side by side on a horizontal plane, but exist in an ordered hierarchy: he is ordered to individual goods (like the good of his biological life), and then to higher and nobler common goods (like the good life that he shares in a virtuous family, a flourishing and friendly neighborhood, and a just society), and ultimately to God, the universal common good of the whole universe. Laws of various kinds direct man toward these various levels of good. Rights can therefore also be understood as a function of a just ordering of each person toward the common good.

 

Note, though, how this view differs from a typical contemporary theory of rights. In the classical Thomistic view, the end (the common good) and the ordering of the community to that end are primary. Rights articulate claims of justice in relation to the end. Consequently, rights are not absolute or unlimited claims, nor are they themselves the ultimate foundation of or reason for our political community. Rather, rights always point to something further and nobler than an individual or private good: the common good of the whole. This is not to say, of course, that individual rights must always bow before the demands of the political authority. To the contrary, Aquinas holds that some rights are a function of the order of man to a good that is prior to or transcends the political community (as we saw him argue concerning the right of a parent to care for his child). But even these rights do not stand on their own; rather, they stand in virtue of their relation to a good.

 

Contemporary rights theorists might object that this classical Thomistic view subordinates the liberty that individual rights guarantee under the common good in such a way that those rights will be endangered whenever the government (or the majority) find them inconvenient. Is this not, they would ask, precisely the reason why we should arm the primacy of individual rights understood as anterior to political society and independent of the common good? A complete answer to this objection would require much longer treatment than can be provided here, but we can at least identify the confusion about the common good hiding in such questions. From Aquinas’s perspective, the common good is not something that competes with the good of individuals, nor is it like other private goods that are diminished when they are shared (e.g., more people invited to the party means a smaller slice of cake for each). A common good is precisely the kind of good that can be shared by many without diminishment, like the good of victory for a sports team, or the good of justice in a city, or the good of peace among states. To say that rights stand in relation to a good, then, is not to say that some kind of alien or hostile “common good” trumps or even destroys the good of the individual. Rather, the common good is a good for the individual, a good of a higher and nobler sort in which the individual participates, and without which it is impossible to have a full measure of human happiness. Human beings are ordered not only to private goods like food and shelter but also to common goods like justice, truth, civic friendship, and peace, and without at least some measure of these common goods, they will neither flourish nor be truly happy. As Aquinas puts it (paraphrasing Aristotle’s Politics), the city exists “not only that men might live, but that they might live well.” at individuals have rights that they can assert, rights that the positive law should recognize, pertains, therefore, not only to the private good of individuals, but to the common good of the community: the “Blessings of Liberty” (as the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution puts it) should not be thought of as describing a merely private good, the individual property of discrete individuals, but rather a dimension of the common good. It is part of the common good that the community be just, that it recognize what is due to its members, that it be governed by the rule of law, and that it be composed of free citizens capable of directing their own lives by their own responsible choices. When the law acknowledges and protects the just right of a citizen, it is doing something quite different from pork-barrel spending that hands out material benefits (that is, essentially private goods) to the favored clients of the ruler. Acknowledging what is due to individuals is (at least in part) what makes a society just.

 

On this view, then, individual rights are not set over against the common good, as if an increase in the common good necessitated a diminishment of individual liberty. Rather, that individuals be secure in their liberties as citizens—that they “possess rights”—is precisely an aspect or dimension of the common good, and the protection of those rights in law is a means for securing the common good of a just republic. In all of this, subjective rights are understood as a function of an overarching order toward a good. To put it another way, rights are important (or even fundamental and indispensable) precisely because of the overarching primacy of the common good and the place that each individual has in the order of the whole.[30]

 

The question then becomes when can a secular or Catholic state suppress certain forms of religious expression? In my opinion a secular state can suppress certain forms of religious expression which go against the natural law (e.g., idolatry); whereas a Catholic state may suppress proselytization among Catholic citizens and even hinder the construction of religious buildings which might undermine the Catholic ethos of the city. As Daniel J. Castellano notes,

 

The erection of religious buildings can be a controversial matter, depending on their specific location and purpose. If their location or purpose is oriented toward corrupting the faith of the Catholic majority, a Catholic state might justly impose limits on such construction, yet at the same time it has a responsibility to allow religious minorities to acquire adequate facilities for public worship in proportion to their numbers.[31]

 

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[1] https://sspx.org/en/1974-declaration-of-archbishop-lefebvre

https://sspx.org/en/%E2%80%9Ci-adhere-eternal-rome%E2%80%9D

[2] John Lessard-Thibodeau, “Arriving at the Juridic Status of the Priestly Fraternity of Saint Pius X,” 44. https://ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/37735/1/Lessard-Thibodeau_John_%202018.pdf

[3] https://www.sspxasia.com/Documents/Archbishop-Lefebvre/Apologia/Vol_one/Chapter_12.htm

[4] https://www.sspxasia.com/Documents/Archbishop-Lefebvre/The-Ordinations-of-June29-1976.htm

[5] Joseph Pohle, The Sacraments: A Dogmatic Treatise (Volume I), edited by Arthur Pruss (St. Louis, Mo: B. Herder, 1915), 111-113.

[6] https://christianity.stackexchange.com/questions/50422/how-does-the-catholic-church-prioritize-different-sources-of-information-in-comi

[7] Ignatius Szal, “Communication of Catholics with Schismatics,” (Washington: CUA 1948), 1-2.

[8] Letter of His Holiness Pope John Paul II to Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre (9 June 1988). Theological Centrum Documentation Service, Vol. VIII, No. 8, August 1995, 12-13.

[9] John A. Abbo & Jerome Daniel Hannan, “The Sacred Canons: A Concise Presentation of the Current Disciplinary Norms of the Church,” Volume 1 (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1960), 44.

[10] H. J. Schroeder, O.P., Canons and decrees of the Council of Trent, (St. Louis, MO: B. Herder Book Co,. 1941), 53.

[11] Charles Augustine, A Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, Book III, Volume IV (St. Louis: B. Herder Book, 1920), 559-560.

[12] Joseph Pohle, The Sacraments: A Dogmatic Treatise (Volume I), edited by Arthur Pruss (St. Louis, Mo: B. Herder, 1915), 111-113.

[13] John Hogan, “The Art of the Liturgy,” in American Ecclesiastical Review, Volume 13, (Philadelphia, PA: American Ecclesiastical Review Co.. 1895), 323.

[14] James O'Kane, Notes on the Rubrics of the Roman Ritual Regarding the Sacraments in General (Dublin: James Duffy, 1867), 47.

[15] Robert Bellarmine, Controversies T. III, lib. 2, De Effectu Sacramentorum, ch. 31.

[16] Robert Bellarmine, On the Roman Pontiff, Volume II, Book 4, translated by Ryan Grant. (Post Falls, ID: Mediatrix Press, 2016), 235.

[17] ibid., 237-238

[18] Alphonsus Liguori, Opera Dogmatica, Tr. V Concilii Tridentini Decreta et Canones, Disp. V, Sess. VII, Decretum de Sacramentis, n. 35. (Translation by Ryan Grant).

[19] Giovanni  Perone, Praelectiones Theologicae, T. 3, De Sacramentorum Ritibus, pp. 44-46: 169. [Quotes Sess. VII can. 13] 170. (Translation by Ryan Grant)

[20] https://adoremus.org/2019/03/q-what-changes-were-made-to-the-tridentine-missal-before-1962/

[21] https://books.google.com/books?id=-cXYqusIEx8C&dq=breviarium%20romanum&pg=PP9#v=onepage&q&f=false

[22] https://books.openedition.org/pur/110216?lang=en

[23] https://www.academia.edu/37099150/Paul_VI_and_Jean_Guitton_on_Archbishop_Marcel_Lefebvre

[24] Joseph Ratzinger, God is Near Us: The Eucharist, the Heart of Life (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003), 66.

[25] https://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/view.cfm?recnum=8777

[26] Summa Theologiae, 1a2ae, Q. 19, a.5.

[27] III Contra Gentiles, 119. 7.

[28] Dominic Legge, Do Thomists Have Rights, Nova et Vetera, English Edition, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2019): 137.

[29] ibid., 146.

[30] ibid., 143-147.

[31] https://www.arcaneknowledge.org/catholic/councils/comment21-13.htm#ch4