Thursday, June 18, 2020

Dogmatic Facts and Universal Acceptance


http://www.trueorfalsepope.com/p/br-bugnolo-redefines-dogmatic-facts-to.html


Dogmatic facts are a secondary object of infallibility. They are facts “connected with a dogma and on which the application of the dogma to a particular case depends.” (Catholic Encyclopedia 1913). They are not simply “legitimate acts” of the Church as Bugnolo pretends, but specific facts that must be infallibly true due to their intimate connection with revealed truths quoad nos.


For example, the binding force of the dogmatic decrees promulgated by the Council of Trent is dependent upon the Council itself being a true Council (a dogmatic fact). Similarly, the infallible certitude that the Immaculate Conception is true, is dependent upon the infallible certitude that Pius IX (who defined the dogma) was a true Pope (another dogmatic fact). Any doubt about the legitimacy of Pius IX’s pontificate ipso facto results in doubt about the dogma he defined - and about the First Vatican Council that he approved and ratified. Thus, a dogmatic fact must be infallibly true because of its relationship to a revealed truth that the Church has infallibly defined, and to preserved the deposit.


The following is from Fr. E. Sylvester Berry’s book, The Church of Christ: An Apologetic and Dogmatic Treatise, which was originally published in 1927, during the pontificate of Pope Pius XI.


“DOGMATIC FACTS. A dogmatic fact is one that has not been revealed, yet is so intimately connected with a doctrine of faith that without certain knowledge of the fact there can be no certain knowledge of the doctrine. For example, was the Vatican Council truly ecumenical? Was Pius IX a legitimate pope? Was the election of Pius XI valid? Such questions must be decided with certainty before decrees issued by any council or pope can be accepted as infallibly true or binding on the Church. It is evident, then, that the Church must be infallible in judging of such facts, and since the Church is infallible in believing as well as in teaching, it follows that the practically unanimous consent of the bishops and faithful in accepting a council as ecumenical, or a Roman Pontiff as legitimately elected, gives absolute and infallible certainty of the fact.”


Here is how another real theologian, Tanquerey, explains dogmatic facts in Vol. I of Dogmatic Theology (1959).


“The Church is infallible in regard to dogmatic facts. A dogmatic fact is one which is so much connected with a doctrine of the Church that knowledge of it is necessary in order to understand the doctrine and to preserve it safely. Dogmatic facts can be threefold: historical, doctrinal and hagiographical. Thus, dogmatic facts are the legitimacy of the Holy Pontiff, the ecumenical (universal) nature of a Council. That the Church is infallible in regard to dogmatic facts is certain.” (Tanquerey, Dogmatic Theology, vol. 1, 1959, p. 146.)


Again, we see that a dogmatic fact must be believed with faith because of its connection to revealed truth, and is a fact that the Church judges infallibly due to its relation with a revealed truth. We will see how the Church infallibly judges them infallibly in a minute.


Msgr. Van Noort provides the same explanation in his manual of Dogmatic Theology, The Church of Christ, published in 1957:


“A dogmatic fact is a fact not contained in the sources of revelation, on the admission of which depends the knowledge or certainty of a dogma or of a revealed truth. The following questions are concerned with dogmatic facts: ‘Was the Vatican Council a legitimate ecumenical council? Is the Latin Vulgate a substantially faithful translation of the original books of the Bible? Was Pius XII legitimately elected Bishop of Rome? One can readily see that on these facts hang the questions of whether the decrees of the Vatican Council are infallible, whether the Vulgate is truly Sacred Scripture, whether Pius XII is to be recognized as supreme ruler of the universal Church." (Christ’s Church, Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1957, p. 112)


Notice that the reason Van Noort said the papacy of Pius XII (the presently reigning Pope) was a dogmatic fact, was not because of its connection to any dogma he defined (although he could have made such an appeal, since Pius XII did define a dogma), but because of the connection between his papacy and the previously defined dogma that the Pope is the supreme ruler of the universal Church. The dogma that the Pope is the supreme ruler of the Church is intimately related to the knowledge (quoad nos or, according to us) of who that supreme ruler is. What this shows that the Church’s infallibility in judging dogmatic facts doesn’t only apply to past Popes, but to the presently reigning Pope as well (and that is because the dogma applies to the reigning Pope). In other words:


The Dogma: The Pope is the supreme ruler of the Church.


Dogmatic Fact: The person that the Church currently recognizes as Pope is the supreme ruler of the Church.


Van Noort also explains how the Church infallibly judges a dogmatic fact:


“Meantime, notice that the Church possesses infallibility not only when she is defining some matters in solemn fashion, but also when she is exercising the full weight of her authority through her ordinary and universal teaching. Consequently, we must hold with an absolute assent, which we call ‘ecclesiastical faith,’ the following theological truths: (a) those which the Magisterium has infallibly defined in solemn fashion; (b) those which the ordinary magisterium dispersed throughout the world unmistakably proposes to its members as something to be held (tenendas). So, for example, one must give an absolute assent to the proposition: ‘Pius XII is the legitimate successor of St. Peter’; similarly … one must give an absolute assent to the proposition: ‘Pius XII possesses the primacy of jurisdiction over the entire Church.’ For — skipping the question of how it begins to be proven infallibly for the first time that this individual was legitimately elected to take St. Peter’s place [i.e., the doctrine of UPA] — when someone has been constantly acting as Pope and has theoretically and practically been recognized as such by the bishops and by the universal Church, it is clear that the ordinary and universal magisterium is giving an utterly clear-cut witness to the legitimacy of his succession.” (Van Noort, Sources of Revelation (Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1957, p. 265.)


As Van Noort and others have explained, if a man has been practically recognized by the bishops and the universal Church as Pope (as is the case with Pope Francis), the Church has infallibly judged that he is the Pope. And if the Church has infallibly judged that a man is Pope, his legitimacy as Pope cannot later be called into question due to alleged defects in his election. To do so would be a rejection of the Church’s infallibility, at least implicitly. This explains why the ‘universal acceptance’ of a Pope is a one-time event that eliminates any future doubts about the validity of his election.


The Consequences of Rejecting this Doctrine


If the entire hierarchy could “theoretically and practically” recognize a man as Pope, and then find out years later that he was not the true Pope, it would mean the Church is not infallible in judging dogmatic facts “when she is exercising the full weight of her authority through her ordinary and universal teaching,” and giving “utterly clear-cut witness” to the legitimacy of a Pope,” by accepting “the legitimacy of his succession.” And if that were the case, then no pontificate (past or present) would be safe; and if no pontificate is safe, no Cardinal appointed by a Pope and no dogma defined by a Pope is safe. Any possible doubt about the legitimacy of a Pope who the entire hierarchy has accepted as Pope, is potential doubt about every papal act, and every dogma that has been defined by a Pope, who the universal Church accepted as Pope. This, of course, is impossible.


Now, there have been times when the identity of the true Pope was not known with certainty, such as during the Great Western Schism, or other times when there were multiple papal claimants. When this happens, the Church herself does not consider the legitimacy of any Pope to be dogmatic fact (“a doubtful Pope is considered no Pope),” unless and until the doubt is cleared up. But this applies to a Pope whose election has always been in doubt, not one that was accepted by the entire Church and later became doubtful. As Fr. Wernz explains in his teaching on a doubtful Pope, “the words 'No pope' are not necessarily understood of a Pope who has previously been received as certain and undoubted by the whole Church, but concerning whose election so many difficulties are subsequently brought to light that he becomes 'a doubtful pope' so that he would thereby forfeit the pontifical power already obtained. This understanding of the axiom concerning 'a doubtful pope' should be reproved…” (Fr. Franz X. Wernz, Ius Decretalium, Tomus II, Romae: De Propoganda Fide, 1898, Scholion 618).


When the entire Church has recognized a man as Pope, his legitimacy cannot later be doubted without calling into question the infallibility of the Church in judging dogmatic facts, and implicitly undermining the legitimacy of every previous Pope and every papal act.


Listen to what Fr. Hunter says about dogmatic facts in his book, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology (1894). His explanation shows how Catholic theologian in the nineteenth century refuted the Protestants who pointed to legal defects in past papal elections, in an attempt to prove that the line of true Popes had come to an end.


“Dogmatic Facts: - But besides these speculative truths, there are certain matters of fact concerning which the Church can judge with infallibly certainty. These are called by many writes dogmatic facts [.]


“First, then, the Church is infallible when she declares what person holds the office of Pope; for if the person of the Pope were uncertain, it would be uncertain what Bishops were in communion with the Pope; (…) Also, it affords an answer to a much vaunted objection to the claims of the Catholic Church, put forward by writers who think that they find proof in history that the election of a certain Pope was simoniacal and invalid, and that the successor was elected by Cardinals who owed their appointment to the simoniacal intruder; from which it is gathered that the Papacy has been vacant since that time. A volume might be occupied if we attempt to expose all the frailness of the argument which is supposed to lead to this startling conclusion; but it is enough to say that if the Bishops agree in recognizing a certain man as Pope, they are certainly right, for otherwise the body of the Bishops would be separated from their head, and the Divine constitution of the Church would be ruined.” (Hunter, Outlines of DogmaticTheology, Volume I (New York, Cincinnati, Chicago, Benzinger Brothers, 1894) ch. VI, N. 211.


Here is how Fr. Kavanagh replied to this same Protestant argument:


“Mr. Gladstone need not be alarmed about the papal succession. Independently of all previous proceedings, the acceptance of Martin V by the Universal Church as lawful Pope proves that his election was canonical and legitimate; for the recognition of the true Pope is a dogmatic fact in which the Universal Church cannot err.” (Rev. James Kavanagh, D.D., A Reply to Mr. Gladstone’s Vaticanism, Dublin, James Guffy, 1895, p. 54)


Notice Fr. Kavanaugh says the acceptance of the universal Church “proves” the election was legitimate and canonical. That’s how the Catholic theologians and canonists of the nineteenth century refuted the Protestants who used arguments that are essentially identical to those of Br. Bugnolo as the basis for rejecting the legitimacy of numerous Popes. This bring us to Bugnolo’s final objection.




What is a Legitimate Election?




Br. Bugnolo: “Siscoe also ignores that John of St. Thomas explicitly said that the concept of universal acceptance regards a legitimate election. That any theologian before or after omits that condition proves nothing, because as anyone who knows theology knows, many authors repeat doctrines imprecisely and incompletely, and their doing of such does not alter the doctrine. Thus you cannot escape from the fundamental condition of the notion of universal acceptance which only regards LEGITIMATE ELECTIONS.”


This objection further highlights Bugnolo’s ignorance of the subject matter he pretends to know. If he had actually read John of St. Thomas’ treatise, he would have learned what is required for a “LEGITIMATE ELECTION,” and would no doubt have been disappointed to learn that Francis’ election meets the necessary criteria. Here is John of St. Thomas’ explanation:


“whoever is elected by the persons that the Church designates to choose a pope in her name, by the very fact that he is accepted by the Church as legitimately elected, is in fact pope. This latter is what the definition of Martin V, related above, as well as the acceptance of the Church, is really about. (…)
As we can see, the two requirements for a legitimate election are: 1) that he is elected by those chosen by the Church to elect (the Cardinals). 2) that the Church accepts the election as legitimate. In other words, a papal “election” is “legitimate” when the Church accepts it as such. Here is what the Dominican theologian further says about the second condition.


“Christ the Lord entrusted it to the Church to choose for herself a man who, for a certain period of time, would be the sort of rule of faith just described; and, consequently, the Church also received the commission to determine, by her own act of acceptance, that this man was canonically and legitimately elected. (…)
Thus, it is the Church’s act of acceptance that determines if the election is “legitimate and canonical.” It doesn't require the “act of acceptance” from Br. Bugnolo or Ann Barnhardt, regardless of how authoritative they imagine their interpretation of canon law, their private judgment of the facts, and their personal act of acceptance to be.
Also notice in the previous quote that John of St. Thomas said this second condition is what “the definition of Martin the V is about.” This is another critical point. John is explaining the Magisterial foundation of the doctrines of UPA and dogmatic facts. The definition he is referring to comes from the Council of Constance, in the form of a proposition that those suspected of heresy were required to affirm in order to determine if they “believed rightly.” It is a proposition that pertains to the Faith itself, and those who did not answer “yes” were marked as heretics.
Here is the definition along with John of St. Thomas’ commentary:
“Martin V, in the Council of Constance, in the condemnation of the errors of Wyclif, which is to be found after the fourth, fifth, and last sessions of the Council, in the interrogations that are to be made of those whose faith is suspect, to see whether they rightly believe, puts this question. ‘Also, whether he believes that the Pope canonically elected, who is reigning at the time (his proper name being given), is the successor of Blessed Peter, having supreme authority in the Church of God?’ [Denz. 674] These words do not speak of the truth of that proposition understood in a general sense—namely, that whoever is lawfully elected is the Supreme Pontiff—but in the particular, concerning whoever is pope at the time, giving his proper name, for instance, Innocent X. It is of this man, whose proper name is given, that the pope is bidding the person suspect in faith to be asked, whether he believes that such a person is the successor of Peter and the Supreme Pontiff: therefore this pertains to the act of faith—not to an inference or a moral certitude; for neither of the latter two is a matter of faith….
“Therefore, we have the certainty of faith, by a revelation implicitly contained in the Creed and in the promise made to Peter, and made more explicit in the definition of Martin V, and applied and declared in act (in exercitio) by the acceptance of the Church, that this man in particular, canonically elected according to the acceptance of the Church, is Pope. The certainty of faith touches this alone; and whatever is prerequisite to, or else follows upon, the fact of the election, is inferred as a theological conclusion drawn from the proposition that is de fide, and is believed mediately. … The Church accepts the election and the elect as a matter of faith, because as she receives him as the infallible rule of faith, and as the supreme head to whom she is united—for the unity of the Church depends upon her union with him.


Notice that the legitimacy of a Pope is de fide if he has been “canonically elected according to the acceptance of the Church,” not the according to the acceptance of Br. Bugnolo or Ann Barnhardt.
Those who refuse to accept a Pope whose election the Church has accepted as legitimate – and who the Church recognizes as its supreme head – reject a matter of the faith itself.
The renowned is the eighteenth-century canonist, Louis Ferraris, confirms that the legitimacy of the currently reigning Pope is de fide, by virtue of this definition of Martin V. He also confirms that it is the Church’s acceptance that determines if the election is legitimate:


“It is of faith (de fide) that Benedict XIV [currently reigning Pope], for instance, legitimately elected and as such by the Church’s acceptance, is the true Pope. This is proved from the Council of Constance, sess. ult. where Martin V. Const. Inter Cunctus, decrees that those who return from heresy to the faith shall be asked, among other points, ‘Whether they believe that the Pope canonically elected, for the time being, his name being expressly mentioned, is the successor of St. Peter, having supreme authority in the Church of God.’ For thereby he supposes it to be an article of faith, since those who abjure heresy are ‘interrogated only as to truths of faith.’ … and it is certain from the fact that the Church receives him as legitimately elected, that God himself reveals to us the election is legitimate (quoque est certa, quia eo ipso quod Ecclesia ipsum recepit ut légitime electum, revelat Deus ipsius electionem esse legitimam); (Ferraris, Louis, Prompta Bibliotheca Canonica Iuridica Moralis Theologica. (Romae: S. C. De Propaganda Fide, 1764) article Papa, Nos. 67).
This is how all the scholastic theologians interpreted and applied the definition of Martin V. To read other theologian’s commentary on this definition, see here.


To sum up our reply to Br. Bugnolo’s objection. The legitimacy of Francis’ election meets both requirements listed by John of St. Thomas: 1) He was elected by those designated by the Church to elect a Pope, and 2) his election has been accepted as canonically valid and legitimate by the Church ever since. Therefore, the legitimacy of his election must be affirmed as a matter of faith, according to the definition of Martin V. And, ironically enough, the same has been affirmed by the very man Alex Bugnolo claims is still the Pope: Cardinal Ratzinger (Benedict XVI) himself.


Cardinal Ratzinger: Benevacantists are Outside the Church


In 1998, Cardinal Ratzinger (Pope Benedict), as head of the Congregation of the Doctrine of Faith, issued a commentary on the 1989 Professio fidei (Profession of Faith). In the commentary, the very man that Bugnolo thinks is the true Pope, explains that the legitimacy of a papal election (that the Church accepts as legitimate, as is the case with Pope Francis), must be held as de fide, based on the infallibility of the Church’s Magisterium. Ratzinger’s theology is consistent, of course, with that of Berry, Tanquery, Van Noort, John of St. Thomas, and every other theologian who has addressed the subject matter (we list 40 of them on our website at www.trueorfalsepope.com).


The 1989 Professio fidei includes three categories of truths: (a) dogmas, (b) doctrines definitely taught by the Church (but not defined as formally revealed), and (c) doctrines taught authoritatively, but not definitively, by the Magisterium. In his commentary, Cardinal Ratzinger explains the nature of assent that is owed to truths contained in each of the respective categories, and describes the consequences of failing to give the required assent. The legitimacy of a papal election falls into the second category, as a dogmatic fact. Here is how Cardinal Ratzinger describes the second category of truths:


“The second proposition of the Professio fidei states: ‘I also firmly accept and hold each and everything definitively proposed by the Church regarding teaching on faith and morals.’


“The object taught by this formula includes all those teachings belonging to the dogmatic or moral area, which are necessary for faithfully keeping and expounding the deposit of faith, even if they have not been proposed by the Magisterium of the Church as formally revealed. Such doctrines can be defined solemnly by the Roman Pontiff when he speaks 'ex cathedra' or by the College of Bishops gathered in council, or they can be taught infallibly by the ordinary and universal Magisterium of the Church as a ‘sententia definitive tenenda’. Every believer, therefore, is required to give firm and definitive assent to these truths, based on faith in the Holy Spirit's assistance to the Church's Magisterium, and on the Catholic doctrine of the infallibility of the Magisterium in these matters.”


The commentary goes on to explain precisely what truths are contained in the second category and (you guessed it) it includes the legitimacy of the election of a Pope:


“The truths belonging to this second paragraph can be of various natures, thus giving different qualities to their relationship with revelation. There are truths which are necessarily connected with revelation by virtue of an historical relationship [i.e., dogmatic facts]; (…) With regard to those truths connected to revelation by historical necessity and which are to be held definitively, but are not able to be declared as divinely revealed, the following examples can be given: the legitimacy of the election of the Supreme Pontiff…”


What is the consequence of denying a truth in the second category? Cardinal Ratzinger explains:


“Whoever denies these truths [second category] would be in a position of rejecting a truth of Catholic doctrine [1] and would therefore no longer be in full communion with the Catholic Church.”


So, according to the official commentary on the 1989 Profession of Faith, issued by Cardinal Ratzinger as head of the Congregation of the Doctrine of Faith, anyone who refuses to give a definitive assent to the legitimacy of the election of the Supreme Pontiff is guilty of denying a Catholic doctrine, and therefore is no longer “in full communion with the Catholic Church;” or, to use pre-Vatican II terminology, has cut himself off from the Church, outside of which there is no salvation.


Cardinal Louis Billot on Universal Acceptance


Cardinal Louis Billot, S.J.
Tractatus De Ecclesia Christi
5th Edition, pp. 623-636
(Rome: Gregorian Pontifical University, 1927)


THESIS XXIX


Since title to the succession of Peter in the primacy of the entire Church is legitimate election as bishop of Rome, one must bear in mind before everything else that, speaking at least according to rule, the conditions of this election depend on pontifical law alone. — Moreover, in a person duly elected and elevated once and for all to the pontificate, power can in fact come to an end through voluntary abdication, but by no means through deposition, and indeed not in any manner whatsoever, if, according to the well founded opinion of Bellarmine and other theologians, the case of a Pontiff who ceased to be of the Church on account of notorious heresy be supposed impossible. — But whatever you may still think about the possibility of this hypothesis, at least one must necessarily admit that the peaceful adherence of the universal Church will always be an infallible sign of the legitimacy of the person of the Pontiff, and what is more, even of the existence of all conditions that are requisite for legitimacy itself.







Cardinal Louis Billot on Notorious Heresy


Louis Billot, Tractatus de ecclesia Christi (1903), p. 296.


Thesis 11 – Although the baptismal character is sufficient of itself to incorporate a man into the true Catholic Church, nevertheless, to have this effect in adults a double condition must be met. The first condition is that the social bond of unity of faith be not impeded by formal, or even material heresy. Nevertheless, because this sort of impediment is caused only by heresy that manifests itself in an open profession, we must conclude that only notorious heretics are excluded from the Body of the Church.

We must establish, in the first place, the proper sense of the term 'heresy.' According to the etymology of the term and its actual usage, which has been the same throughout all of tradition, that man is properly called a heretic who, after embracing Christianity in the sacrament of baptism, does not accept from the magisterium of the Church the rule of what is to be believed, but takes from somewhere else the norm for his beliefs in matters of faith and concerning the teaching of Christ. He might follow other religious teaching authorities, or he might adhere to the principle of free examination, professing the complete independence of reason; or, finally, he might disbelieve only one of the articles that are proposed by the Church as dogmas of faith.

Note, then, the difference between infidelity and heresy. [1] First of all, the general sin of infidelity can exist in any man having the use of reason, while heresy is proper to one who has received the sacrament of faith, that is, the baptismal character.  Moreover, for general infidelity it is enough for someone to disbelieve truths revealed by God and sufficiently proposed to him as such. The notion of heresy, however, includes another element: departure from the social magisterium, which was divinely constituted to be the authoritative organ for the proposal of revealed truth in Christian society. Hence, general infidelity prescinds from any special condition in its opposition to divine faith, while heresy is opposed to this same faith in precisely the way that it ought to be in a Christian: under the rule, and in dependence upon that authority to which it belongs to govern, in the place of God, the society of believers.


Now, heretics are divided into formal and material. Formal heretics are those to whom the authority of the Church is sufficiently known.  Material heretics are those who, affected by invincible ignorance concerning the Church herself, choose in good faith another rule to determine what they are to believe.  The heresy of material heretics is not imputed as a sin; on the contrary, it is possible for them to have even that supernatural faith which is the commencement and root of all justification; for, they might believe all the principal articles explicitly, and believe the others, not explicitly, but implicitly, by the disposition of their minds, and the good intention they have of believing all truths whatsoever are sufficiently proposed to them as revealed by God.  Consequently, they can still belong in desire to the body of the Church and meet the other conditions necessary for salvation.

Nevertheless, because we are concerned with real incorporation into the visible Church of Christ, our thesis does not distinguish between formal and material heretics—understanding the latter according to the notion of material heresy that we have just explained, which alone is the proper and genuine sense of the term.  For, if by “material heretic” you understand one who professes dependence upon the Magisterium of the Church in matters of faith, but denies something defined by the Church because he is ignorant of the fact that it was defined, or holds an opinion contrary to Catholic teaching because he mistakenly thinks that it is taught by the Church, then it would be utterly absurd to put material heretics outside the body of the true Church; but this would also be to distort completely the true meaning of the word.  For, a sin is called “material” only when all the elements of that sin are present materially, but without advertence or deliberate choice. Now, heresy by its nature requires departure from the rule of the ecclesiastical magisterium.  In the case cited, there is no departure; there is only an error of fact about what the rule dictates.  Such an error cannot be heresy, even materially so.

…we will direct our attention to another division.  Heretics are divided into occult and notorious. Occult heretics are, in the first place, those who by a purely internal act disbelieve dogmas of faith proposed by the Church, and after that, those who do indeed manifest their heresy by external signs, but not by a public profession [i.e., renunciation of the Magisterium as the rule of faith]. Among them, you will easily understand that many men of our times fall into the latter category—those, namely, who either doubt or positively disbelieve matters of faith, and do not disguise the state of their mind in the private affairs of life, but who have never expressly renounced the faith of the Church, and, when they are asked categorically about their religion, declare of their own accord that they are Catholics.


Only the notorious are excluded [from the Church], and not the occult—among whom we must also number (as it seems to us) those who, sinning against the faith even externally, have never departed from the rule of the Church’s magisterium by a public profession.


That occult heretics are still in the Church can be shown, in the first place, by an argument drawn from the general principle that was declared above.  For, baptism of its very nature gathers men into the visible body of the Catholic Church; this effect is always joined to it, unless there be something in the recipient of baptism that prevents it—something incompatible with the social bond of ecclesiastical unity.  Moreover, the social bond, because it is social, is of it very nature external and manifest.  As long, therefore, as heresy is not openly professed, but stays within the mind, or is confined to manifestations that do not suffice for notoriety (vel iis continetur manifestationibus quae ad notorietatem non sufficient), it by no means prevents one from being joined to the visible structure of the Church; and by this fact the baptismal character (by which we are made to be of the body of the Church) necessarily continues to have its effect."


Objection: At the time of the Jansenist heresy, there were many bishops who openly appealed against the Bull Unigenitus [the papal bull of Clement XI that condemned over 100 Jansenist propositions] and other papal Constitutions, whether preceding or following, that had been received in the whole Church.  These, therefore, were notorious heretics. Notwithstanding this, they were still considered as true bishops having communion with the Apostolic See, and therefore as true members of the Church.  Therefore it is false to say, even of notorious heresy, that it puts a man outside the body of the Church.

Answer: I reply that the Jansenists were more innovative than other heretics in coming up with every kind of subterfuge in order to evade the anathemas of the Church, so that, by dissembling themselves in every way, they might diffuse more efficaciously the virus of their doctrine. There is nothing to wonder at, then, if the heresy of some, because of the great cunning of their artifices, was not so notorious among their contemporaries.