Robert Bellarimine, “On Councils: Their Nature and Authority,” translated by Ryan Grant (Post Falls, ID: Mediatrix Press, 2017), 128-134.
The Lutherans, who call themselves Protestants, propose eight conditions for celebrating a Council. Since Gaspar Villalpando has made a sufficient dissertation on these, we will briefly refute them here.
Firstly, therefore, they require that before the Council occurs all the acts of the Council of Trent be invalidated.
Secondly, that the Council be conducted in Germany; for there the canon Ecclesiasticus, cited by Cyprian (lib. 1 epist. 3) says that suits should be judged in the places where they arose.
Thirdly, that the Roman Pontiff should not summon the Council, nor preside in it, but that it should be on the other side of those litigating, just as when someone is accused and no man is at the same time the judge and the accusing party.
Fourthly, that sentences should be imposed only from the divine Scripture, not from Traditions.
Fifthly, that the decision should not be made in the power of a plurality of votes, but pronounced according to the norm of the divine word.
Sixthly, that the Roman Pontiff would absolve all prelates from the oath of fidelity, in which they have been bound.
Seventhly, that theologians of the principles and statutes of the Augsburg Confession, no less than Bishops in the Council, be permitted decisive opinions and voices.
Eighthly, that safe conduct be granted by the emperor, not only to persons, but even to those principal cases, i.e., that neither can persons be punished if they refuse to assent to the Council, nor the faith and confession of the Lutherans can be condemned, even if the Lutheran theologians cannot defend it.
They say with these conditions that they desire a Council with all their heart, and they call this a truly pious and free Council.
The first condition is unjust because nothing ought to be held invalid unless it is condemned by a legitimate judgment. Moreover, the Council of Trent is accused by heretics but has not been condemned by any legitimate judge. Therefore, just as the second Council of Ephesus was condemned at the Council of Chalcedon, and the Council of Constantinople against images was condemned at the seventh Council, so also the Council of Trent, if it must be condemned, ought to be examined and judged in another Council, but not invalidated before the judgment of another Council.
The second condition is also unjust, for the Lutherans seem to seek the right for themselves that the Council not be conducted in Italy, where Catholics prevail, so Catholics can rightly demand that it not be conducted in Germany, where the Lutherans prevail, and really a better and more suitable place could not have been chosen than Trent, which is on the borders of Germany and Italy, even if this question were relinquished to the judgment of a heathen man.
Moreover, to the canon which is cited by Cyprian, I say that canon is understood on particular cases, i.e. on crimes of particular men, which ought to be judged where they are committed, because there witnesses can be discovered more easily; but on cases of faith which pertain to the whole Church, there is another reason. The question on the cessation of the law arose at Antioch, but it was finished in the Council of the Apostles at Jerusalem (Acts 15); the Arian heresy arose at Alexandria in Egypt, but it was judged at Nicaea in Bithynia; the heresy of Nestorius rose at Constantinople, but it was condemned at Ephesus; the Monophysite heresy was born at Constantinople, it was condemned at Chalcedon; the heresy of the Originists, Didymus and Evagrius was judged in the fifth Council at Constantinople, but it hardly arose there; the Monothelyte heresy was born in Alexandria, Cyrus being its author, and was condemned first at Rome in the Council of Pope St. Martin, then at the sixth Council in Constantinople; lastly, the heresy of the Iconoclasts, which arose at Constantinople, or at least was wonderfully increased and had been strengthened there, was judged and condemned at the second Council of Nicaea in Bithynia, and before also at Rome in a Council.
Add that the Lutherans have also had not a few provincial Councils such as at Cologne, Moguntinus, and others in which they were condemned. Our adversaries should not object if these Councils were made up of Papists, for all heretics could make the same objection. In the Church it has always been preserved that those who were then Bishops would judge controversies, and new Bishops were not created because of new questions.
The third condition is unjust, because the Roman Pontiff cannot be deprived of his right to summon Councils and preside over them, in whose possession this right has already been for 1500 years, unless he were first convicted by the legitimate judgment of a Council and is not the Supreme Pontiff. Moreover, what they say, that the same man ought not be a judge and a party, I say has place in private men, but not in a supreme prince. For the supreme prince, as long as he is not declared or judged to have legitimately been deprived of his rule, is always the supreme judge, even if he litigates with himself as a party.
Therefore, private men, when they litigate with their prince, usually appeal from the prince badly represented, to represent the same better, and it is confirmed from the ancient histories, for when Marcellinus sinned, and on account of it he gathered a Council, all the Bishops said he could not be condemned by anyone, rather he ought to be the judge, and the defendant, as Nicholas I relates in his epistle to the Emperor Michael. Likewise, Sixtus III, when he was accused of adultery, the Emperor gathered a Council with the Pope’s consent, but in that Council no man dared to strike up the case of the Pope unless first he would have said that he willed the case to be discussed, even if he would be judged by his own judgment, but not judged. It is clear both from the acts of that Council and from the epistle of the same Sixtus to the Bishops of the east.
Next, in the fourth Roman Council under Symmachus, we read that all the Bishops said the Council could not be summoned by right unless it were by the Pope, even if he were the one that were accused. For this purpose, did not Arius litigate with Alexander on the faith? And still in the Council of Nicaea Alexander sat, because he was a Bishop as a judge. Likewise, in the third Council Cyril presided in episcopal judgment, still it was said on the side of the Nestorians to have the side of those litigating. So also in the fourth Council, legates of Pope Leo presided, although the whole case turned the dispute between Leo and Dioscorus. It happens also that the Pope in a Council is not only the judge, but has many colleagues, that is, all the Bishops who, if they could convict him of heresy, they could also judge and depose him even against his will. Therefore, the heretics have nothing: why would they complain if the Roman Pontiff presides at a Council before he were condemned?
The fourth condition is unjust, because that which was once defined ought not be recalled into doubt, according to the law of the Emperor Maritanus, l. nemo; c. de summa Trinitate et fide Catholica. It is certain, however, in the seventh general Council that it was defined that unwritten traditions must not be received. Although, however, that condition is so unjust; still it could be admitted as long as again it were not legitimately defined in a Council that these must be received for the word of God. Hence, the Council of Trent, before it progressed to other things, defined the Scriptures and the Apostolic Traditions received for the word of God.
The fifth condition altogether abolishes the form of Councils that we showed above, and on that account it cannot be done that at some time it would arrive at the end of controversies unless place were given to the greater side of those with a vote, for when both sides advance testimonies of the Scriptures, how can it be understood what the teaching of the Council is unless it is gathered by a vote, and the opinion of the greater would prevail?
The sixth condition is unjust and impertinent. Unjust, because inferiors ought not be free from the obedience to superiors, unless first he were legitimately deposed or declared not to be a superior, just as it would be unjust that as often as imperial assemblies were conducted, the Emperor ought to make the oath of fidelity that all the princes must offer in subjection to him free. Moreover, it is no new or recent thing that Bishops should furnish an oath of obedience to the Pope, as is clear from St. Gregory (lib. 1 epist. 31) and from cap. Significasti, extra de elect. Likewise, from the eleventh Council of Toledo (ca. 10). Furthermore, it is impertinent because that oath does not take away the freedom of the Bishops, which is necessary in Councils, for they swear they will be obedient to the supreme Pontiff, which is understood as long as he is Pope, and provided he commands these things which, according to God and the sacred canons he can command; but they do not swear that they are not going to say what they think in the Council, or that they are not going to depose him if they were to clearly prove that he is a heretic.
The seventh condition, if it were understood to be on a properly decisive vote in a form of judgment, it is opposed to the fifth condition, and is against the form of all Councils, as we showed above; if it were understood improperly, and a “decisive voice” were called the divine Scripture in testimony of some teaching brought to the fore, then the condition is most just and was never denied to the Protestants, nay more it was offered to them three times in the Council of Trent, namely in session 13, 15 and 18.
The last condition for the first part, i.e. what attains to the safe conduct of persons, was offered to the Protestants, as is clear from the same places of the Council of Trent, namely sessions 13, 15 and 18; for the second part it is altogether inept and ridiculous, for it is as if they were to have clearly said we want the Bishops of the whole Christian world to be troubled, and take up expenses and suffer great labors to come to the Council, and nevertheless, when they come we will refuse anything to be established, nor quarrels ever to be settled.
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