John of St. Thomas, O.P.
On
the Loss of Papal Office due to Heresy
On
the Authority of the Supreme Pontiff, Disp. 2, Art. 3
Whether a Pope can be Deposed by the
Church, even as he is Elected by her; and in what Cases?
I suppose that the Pope can lose the
papacy in three ways. Firstly, through natural death; secondly, through
voluntary abdication; thirdly, through deposition. (…) On this third way of
losing the papacy, many difficulties call for our consideration; but that we
may be brief in our treatment we will reduce all the difficulties to two
principal headings: namely, in what cases deposition is possible, and by what
power it ought to be accomplished. And, to address the first question,
there are three principal cases in which the deposition of a Pope can
occur. The first is the case of heresy or infidelity; the second, that of
perpetual insanity; the third, that of doubt concerning the validity of an
election.
Concerning the case of heresy,
theologians and jurists dispute over many things, and our work does not permit
us to discuss all of them in great detail; but all the doctors agree that the
Pope can be deposed for heresy, and we shall cite them when we treat of the
difficulties. We have an explicit text in the chapter Si papa,
distinction 40, where it is said: “No mortal man presumes to rebuke the Pope
for his faults, because he who is to judge all men is judged by no one, unless
he be found to have deviated from the faith.” This exception manifestly
signifies that a judicial sentence should be passed against the Pope in the
case of heresy. The same is confirmed by the letter of [Pope] Adrian II,
related in the eighth general Synod, session VII, in which he says that the
Roman Pontiff is judged by no one; but, [he adds,] an anathema was pronounced
against [Pope] Honorius by the [bishops of] the East because he had been
accused of heresy, which alone makes it licit for inferiors to resist the doings
of their superiors. Similarly, even Pope St. Clement says in his first
epistle that St. Peter taught that a heretical Pope should be deposed.[1]
The reason for this is the following:
we are obliged to separate ourselves from heretics, according to 1 Tim. 3: “A
heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid.” But he who
remains in the Pontificate should not be avoided; on the contrary, the Church
is obliged to be united to him and to be in communion with him, since he is her
supreme head; therefore, if the Pope is a heretic, either the Church is obliged
to remain in communion with him, or else he ought to be deposed from the
papacy. The first hypothesis—that the Church is obliged to follow a
heretical head—is evidently destructive to the Church and of its very nature
involves the danger that the whole ecclesiastical government would fall into
error; on the other hand, since the heretic is an enemy of the Church, the
Church has a natural right to take action against such a Pope, because she has
the right to self-defense against her enemies, and a heretical Pope is an
enemy; consequently, she has the right to take action against him. By all
means, then, the second option should be taken, and such a Pope should be
deposed.
But you will object, saying that
Christ our Lord allowed unbelieving and heretical men to remain in the chair of
Moses, such as the Pharisees were; “The Scribes and Pharisees have sat upon the
chair of Moses; therefore, observe and do whatever they tell you” (Mt.
23). St. Jerome, in his commentary on the eighth chapter of Isaias,
writes that the Pharisees were heretics and held perverse dogmas in accordance
with various superstitions and traditions; and their errors have been
enumerated by Epiphanius (in Panario, libro 1, cap. 16), Josephus (de bello
Judaico lib. 2, cap. 7 ad finem), and Baronius (in apparatu annalium, cap.
7). Therefore, even a heretic and an unbeliever should be allowed to
remain upon the chair of Peter—for he cannot [solemnly] define his heresy or
error [as a dogma of faith, for Papal infallibility would prevent this], and
thus the Church will always remain free from heresy.
I respond that Christ our Lord did
not command that the Pharisees be permitted to remain on the chair of Moses
even in the case that they should be declared as heretics, but only on
condition that they are still tolerated; and this applies to any heretic or
unbeliever who is in the priesthood or episcopacy. If they have not yet
been declared [as heretics] and deposed from their position of authority, the
faithful ought to listen to them and obey them, because they still retain their
power and jurisdiction; but if the Church should decide to tolerate them no
longer, and declares them to be heretics, Christ our Lord does not prohibit
this in the words cited above.
But the question arises whether the
Pope can be deposed in any case of heresy, and in whatever way he may be a
heretic, or if certain conditions are required, without which heresy alone is
not sufficient to depose the Pope. I respond that the Pope cannot be
deposed or lose the papacy unless two conditions are simultaneously met:
namely, that the heresy be public and juridically notorious, not occult; and
that he be incorrigible and pertinacious in his heresy. When these two
conditions are met the Pope can be deposed, but he cannot be deposed without
them; and, on the other hand, even if he is not an infidel in his heart, but
exteriorly he behaves like a heretic, he can be deposed, and the sentence of
deposition will be valid.
Now, concerning the first condition,
even among Catholic authors there are some who disagree, thinking that the Pope
loses his papal jurisdiction even for occult heresy, since jurisdiction is founded
on the true faith and its orthodox profession; and we can cite the following
authors as supporting this latter opinion:
Turrecremata (lib. 4, 2 p. a capite
18, et lib. 2, cap. 102), Paludanus (in opusculo de hac re), Castro (lib. 2 de
justa haereticorum punitione, cap. 22 et 23), Simancas (de catholicis
institutionibus, cap. 21), Driedo (de libertate Christiana, cap. 16), and
others.
And some authors defend this
position so abolutely that they think the Pope would fall from the papacy even
because of a [purely] mental heresy; and their reasoning is that, in order to
be Pope, it is required as a necessary condition that he be a member of the
Church—for as Pope he is her supreme head—and that he be joined to the rock
upon which the Church is founded, that is, the faith and the confession of
Peter. For, even as the Church cannot be without interior faith, neither
can the papacy, since it is founded upon the same profession [of faith] as the
Church is; and it was for this reason that Christ asked for this profession of
faith from Peter before He promised him the papacy. And Azorius (as cited
above in chapter 7) attributes this opinion to Turrecremata and Castro.
Others think that it is necessary
for the heresy to be external, and externally proved, for the Pope to be
deposed from the papacy; and the authors who hold this opinion are the
following:
Soto (in 4, dist. 22, quaest. 2,
art. 2), Cano (lib. 4 de locis, capite ultimo ad duodecim—he does not even
concede any probability to the opposite opinion), Cajetan (de auctoritate
papae, cap. 18 et 19), Suarez, Azorius, and Bellarmine (lib. 2 de Romano
pontifice, cap. 30).
The foundation for this opinion is
that occult heretics, as long as they are not condemned by the Church and cut
off from her, remain parts of the Church, and are in communion with her
exteriorly, although they do not share in her interior spirit; even the Pope,
therefore, is not cut off from the Church by the fact that he is an occult
heretic; consequently, he can still be her head, even as he is still a part and
a member, although not a living one.
This opinion is confirmed by the
fact that lesser priests [i.e., lower members of the hierarchy] can exercise
acts of [the powers of] Order and ecclesiastical jurisdiction; for a heretical
priest can confect the Sacraments and give absolution in extreme necessity;
therefore, not even faith is required for the Pope to exercise his
jurisdiction, as long as he has not been deposed by the Church; and this is
especially true in his case, because [as Pope] he is not capable of incurring
excommunication for being a heretic, as inferiors can.
Finally, if the Pope, by the very
fact of being an occult heretic, fell from the Papacy even before the Church
becomes aware of it and judges him, it would follow as a consequence that, if
he speedily came back to his senses by sincere repentance, he could no longer
exercise the functions of the papacy, since he has lost that dignity, and it is
not restored by God through Penance as grace is. But if he cannot act as
Pope he will be obliged to renounce the papacy, which is certainly a very grave
inconvenience; for he will be obliged to betray himself; for it will be
necessary to publicize the reason for his renunciation, or at least to consult
others about the matter. Moreover, many other problems would follow if,
by the very fact that he is an occult heretic, the Pope would lose the papacy;
for everything would become perplexing, and the door would be opened to schism,
if without considering the judgment of the Church he were to lose the papacy
for an offence known perhaps to him alone.
This reasoning removes the
foundation from the other opinion, since, in order for someone to be Pope, it
is required only that he be a member of the Church by exterior communication,
at least in the way that someone is said to be sufficiently a member of the
Church in order to govern her externally (for it is in this sense that the Pope
is head of the Church), even if he does not participate in her interior spirit
by reason of an occult heresy or sin; and it suffices for him to be united to
the rock and to the Church in this way, that is, by exterior communication; for
he is considered by the Church as joined to her as long as he has not been cut
off by her or declared to be a heretic.
As to the other argument
adduced—namely, that the Church cannot remain the true Church without interior
faith—I respond that [if that were true] it could be proved in the same way
that the Pope cannot retain the papacy without grace, and that he loses it by
the very fact of falling into mortal sin—which was a heresy of Wycliff,
condemned among his articles in the Council of Constance—because, even as the
Church (taken generally) cannot exist without interior faith, so neither can it
exist without charity.
The authority of the papacy,
therefore, is not founded upon the personal faith of any individual, inasmuch
as any one person can express it according to his own understanding; rather, it
is founded upon the common faith of the whole Church—and the fact that the Pope
cannot fail in this faith means that, even if he were personally a heretic, yet
insofar as he teaches ex cathedra he cannot teach anything contrary to
the faith. It is in this faith, therefore—which is the faith of
the papacy, and not of the person; and which was the faith of Peter and his
confession—in this alone the papacy is founded, and not in the personal faith
even of the very person of the Pope.
Now, since the Church by definition
is the congregation of all the faithful, it is incompatible with her nature for
all of her members to without the true faith of God, even mental, in the same
way that it is impossible for all the faithful to be without grace.
The second condition for the Pope to
be deposed—namely, that he be incorrigible and contumacious in his heresy—is
evident; for, if he is ready to be corrected, nor pertinacious in his heresy,
he is not considered to be a heretic, as we gather from the chapter Dixit
Apostolus 24, q. 3; therefore, if the Pope is ready to be corrected, he
should not be deposed as a heretic. It is also evident from the fact that
the Apostle commands that the heretic be avoided only after a first and second
admonition; consequently, if after being admonished he returns to his senses,
he is not to be avoided. Since, then, it is because of that very precept
of the Apostle that a Pope ought to be deposed for heresy, it follows from the
same precept that, if he can be corrected, he is not to be deposed. And
indeed, since the Pope, before he is deposed, ought to be urged to return to
his right mind, plainly if he corrects himself after being admonished it does
not seem possible to proceed further by deposing him.
It is of some help to consider the
case of Pope Marcellinus as described in the chapter Nunc autem of the
21st distinction (which we have already address in the preceding
disputation). For, although he was declared to be an infidel by a Council
of bishops; nevertheless, because he returned to his senses and was willingly
corrected, he remained in the papacy, and as Pope he later died for the faith;
therefore, unless a Pope abide pertinaciously and incorrigibly in his heresy,
he should not be deposed from the papacy. See the gloss by Hugon on the
chapter Si Papa, distinction 40 (cited above), where he holds the same
opinion and declares that, if a Pope falls into heresy and, after being
corrected, lapses once again, he can be corrected a second time; but after two
corrections, if he falls into heresy once more, he is not to be admitted back,
even if he shows himself ready to be corrected, but is rather to be considered
incorrigible and deposed; and Cajetan, in his Opusculum de auctoritate papae,
ch. 22, provides a good foundation for this with the saying of the Apostle:
“After the first and second correction avoid [him], knowing that such a one is
subversive.” When, therefore, the first and second corrections have been
given, and he falls once more into heresy, he is considered to be incorrigible
according to human judgment; and so, lest the corrections be iterated without
end, they are terminated with the second one, and after this he is held to be
incorrigible. (…)
The second case of the deposition of
a Pope is that of perpetual insanity. (…)
The third case of the deposition of
a Pope is where there is doubt as to the validity of a papal election; and
under this heading we include all those instances in which the Church cannot
free herself from doubt and become certain of who is her head; for, because the
election of Popes has been committed to her, she has the right to have
certainty about the one who is elected to be Pope and her universal head. (…)
In every case in which there is doubt as to who is true Pope, or as to the
election, it pertains to the Church to judge the matter, not because she is
superior to the Pope (even if he be Pope in reality), but because she is
superior to the election of the Pope and all the doubts that can arise
from it; and [this means that] she is superior per accidens to the one
who is, in reality, a real Pope.
But you will object: What if the
Church someone not to be a true Pope who in reality and in the sight of God
really is the Pope, although others are in doubt about it? For, in that
case, he has already received supreme power over the Church from Christ our
Lord, for he has it from his election, which was valid in itself [even if it
was not so in the estimation of others]. Hence, even if the Church
[putatively] deposes him, she will not be able to take away the power given him
by Christ our Lord, for this cannot be lost without the fault of the one
elected. In such a case, if the Church proceeds to elect another Pope,
there will then be two persons in the Church who really and in the sight of God
have supreme power over the Church—which is impossible, since by the
institution of Christ our Lord there ought to be only one supreme pastor;
therefore, it is impossible that this supreme power would really be given to
two persons because of the action of the Church.
I respond that there is no doubt
that the Church can judge and depose a Pope who is innocent in reality, but
proven to be harmful, just as, if he were not a heretic in reality, but
nevertheless were juridically proven to be a heretic exteriorly, he could be held
not to be the Pope. For even as, when he is truly at fault, he loses the
papacy, not when he committed the fault and had not yet been judged by the
Church, but rather when the Church declares him to have committed it; so also,
even if he is not at fault in reality, nevertheless, if he is guilty according
to the declaration of the Church (because it has been juridically proven so),
he still loses the papacy. For this is expedient for the governing of the
Church, which is done in a human manner and with human proofs, which require
only juridical truth, not mathematical; and, because the papacy does not
consists in a character, which cannot be destroyed by any action, but rather in
jurisdiction, which can depend upon moral conditions, therefore, the power of
the papacy can depend upon the moral and juridical notoriety of a fault as a
condition [for the loss of its possession], even though [the possessor] be
innocent in reality.
Nevertheless, I add that it seems
more likely that such a case—namely, that the Church should judge someone not
to be Pope who really is Pope in reality—is impossible; for this would mean
that the universal Church erred on a matter that is extremely serious and
affects the whole body of the Church; so that, even as the Church cannot err in
judging to canonize a saint, so also it seems impossible that the Church would
err in condemning someone as a heretic and deposing him from the papacy; nor
would God permit her to judge that one who in fact is really Pope is not the
Pope.
But you will ask if we should admit
of any case, besides those already given, in which the Pope should be
deposed. I respond in the negative; any case that can be imagined is
reduced to one of these three, and he can be deposed for no other. This
is the common opinion of theologians, and also of many jurists. (…) The reason
for this is, first of all, that in law there is no crime for which the Pope can
be deposed except heresy. (…) The second and even stronger reason is that,
according to law, the Pope is judged by no one (…); therefore the deposition
of a Pope cannot be done directly, by way of judgment and punishment,
since the Pope has no superior on earth by whom he could be punished or
corrected. He can be deposed, then, only because on his side there is
an incompatibility with being head of the Church; namely, because he is
separated and segregated from her by leaving the faith, in such wise that the
Church has the obligation to avoid him; whereas for other sins (no matter how
grave) the Church is never obliged to avoid him, because he is not segregated
from her—nor can he be separated from her by excommunication—and therefore he
should not be forced out from the papacy; for, if he were forced out of it, the
reason would not be that the Church cannot adhere and remain united to him, but
rather that she repels the Pope from the papacy as being unworthy of it due to
his demerits; but this latter cannot be done except by someone having authority
and jurisdiction over the guilty one who is being punished for his demerits;
and since this power is found in no man, not even in the Church (since the Pope
cannot have any superior on earth), consequently he cannot be judged for such
crimes. Neither is the Pope directly judged for heresy; but,
because Scripture and Divine Law oblige the Church to separate herself from a
heretic and not to communicate with him, therefore, once she has declared
that he is a heretic, the Church cannot regard him as her head; for she cannot communicate
with him; but the head to which the body is not united and with which it does
not communicate is no head at all.
And with this explanation we can
dispel the reasons that move some canonists to hold the opposite opinion. (…)
These think that a Pope can be deposed for simony and other crimes that
threaten to cause great harm and scandal to the Church; for, even as the heresy
of a Pope can seriously threaten the Church, so also can other crimes, by which
he might destroy her government and treat her with violence in the manner of a
tyrant; but by Natural Law the Church can defend herself and repel him by
force; but this is impossible unless she depose him, even as she deposes him
for the crime of heresy; and she would be doing it for the same reasons. (…)
Nevertheless, what we have already established sets these arguments at naught;
for, even if it is true that a criminal Pope is very detrimental to the Church,
nevertheless, the Church is neither obliged nor able to separate herself from
his communion; nor can she punish him judicially; and therefore she ought to
sustain him as her head. But in the case of heresy she is obliged to
separate herself from him, as was said; and because of his heresy she should
not regard him as her head. But [in the case of other crimes] she can
still defend herself, not indeed by deposing him, but by repelling him with
force if he proceeds against her with tyrannical violence; and if he wishes to
take up arms in order to perpetrate something contrary to justice, she can take
up arms to repel him; and, similarly, if he decrees something contrary to good
morals he is not to be obeyed, for an unjust law has no binding force. (…)
But another difficulty remains to be
discussed: namely, by what power this deposition of the Pope should be
accomplished. And the whole question turns around two points. The
first is the declaratory sentence by which the crime of the Pope is
declared. Who should issue it, the Cardinals or a general Council?
And if a general Council, by whose authority should it be summoned, and who has
the power to decide such a case? The second point is the deposition
itself, which is to be done after a sentence has been passed declaring the
crime. Is it done by the power of the Church, or is it done by Christ our
Lord himself without any intermediary as soon as the declaration has been made?
To address the first point: we
should say that this handling of the deposition of a Pope, as regards the
declaration of the crime, pertains in no way to the Cardinals, but to a general
Council. This is evident, first of all, from the practice of the Church;
for in the case of [Pope] Marcellinus, who offered incense to idols, a Synod
was convoked to discuss his cause, as we gather from the chapter Nunc autem,
distinction 21. And in the case of the schism in which there were three
putative Popes claiming obedience the Synod of Constance was gathered to sedate
the schism. Also, in the case of Pope Symmachus, the Council of Rome was
gathered to discuss the accusations that had been made against him, as Antonius
Augustinus relates in his treatise on law (epitome juris de pontifice
maximo, titulo 13); and the canons cited above testify that the Popes who
wished to purge themselves of certain charges brought against them did so in
the presence of Councils. Secondly, it is also certain that the power to
handle the causes of Popes, as well as those things that pertain to their
deposition, has never been entrusted to the Cardinals; hence, it remains in the
deposit of the Church, whose authority is represented by a general Council; for
only the election of Popes has been committed to the Cardinals, and nothing
more, as can be ascertained by reading the citations from canon law that we
have provided in the first article [of this disputation]. (…)
But we have yet to explain by whose
authority this Council should be convoked; for it cannot be done by the
authority of the Pope, since it is gathered in opposition to him; but no
Council can be legitimate unless it is convoked by the authority of the Pope;
hence, the Pope can deny any Council its right to convoke, and can nullify it,
if it is gathered against his will—especially since, before the declaration of
his crime, he still has the power of Pope; therefore, any Council that is
gathered is subject to his power, and consequently he can dissolve it if he
wishes.
I respond that such a Council can be
convoked by the authority of the Church, which is in the bishops, or the
greater part of them; for by Divine Law the Church has the right to segregate
herself from a heretical Pope, and consequently she has the right to apply all
the means that of their very nature are necessary for this segregation; but one
such means, which is necessary of its very nature, is that she acquire
juridical certainty about the crime; but the crime cannot be juridically
certified unless she form a competent judgment; and in so grave a matter a
competent judgment cannot be issued by any except a general Council, for we are
dealing with the universal head of the Church, wherefore the matter belongs to
the judgment of the universal Church, which is had in a general Council.
And therefore I do not agree with Fr. Suarez, who thinks that this matter could
be handled by provincial Councils; for a provincial Council does not represent
the universal Church, and therefore it does not have the authority of the
universal Church, in order to be able to decide the matter; and even if many
provincial Councils were gathered they would neither represent the universal
Church nor have her authority.
But if we speak, not of the
authority by which the judgment is rendered, but of that by which the Council
is convoked, I do not think that its convocation has been entrusted to anyone
in a determinate manner; but I think that it could be done either by the
Cardinals, who would be able to give the bishops knowledge of what is going on;
or else the bishops who are nearer [geographically to the Pope] could denounce
the matter to the others, so that all would come; or again, it could even
happen at the insistence of the [Catholic] princes—in which case the summons
would not, indeed, have any coercive force, as it has when the Pope convokes a
Council; rather, it would be denunciative in nature, notifying the bishops of
the [alleged] crime and making it manifest that they should come to remedy the
situation.
The Pope, therefore, cannot annul
such a Council, since he himself is a part [of the Church], and the Church by
Divine Law has the power to gather a Council for this end, because she has the
right to segregate herself from a heretic.
However, concerning the second
point—namely, by whose authority the declaration and deposition are to be
accomplished—there is disagreement among theologians, for it is not apparent
who should effect the deposition, since it is an act of judgment and
jurisdiction, and no one can exercise these in relation to the Pope.
Cajetan (in opusculo de potestate papae, capite 20) relates two explanations
that are extreme opposites, and two others that are in the middle.
Two Extreme Opinions: One of the
extremes is that the Pope, by the very fact [ipso facto] that he is a
heretic, is deposed without any human judgment. The other extreme is that
there is a power that is superior to the Pope without any qualification, and
this power is able to judge him.
Two Middle Opinons: Of the two
intermediate opinions, the one holds that the pope does not recognize anyone as
superior absolutely, but only in the case of heresy. The other holds that
there is no power on earth that is superior to the Pope, whether absolutely or
in the case of heresy; but there is a ministerial power. Even as
the Church has a ministerial power in the election of a Pope—not as to the
conferring of power, since this is done immediately by Christ, as we have said
in the first article; but in the designation of the person—so, too, in the
deposition (which is the destruction of the bond by which the papacy is joined
to this particular person) the Church has a ministerial power and deposes the
Pope ministerially, while it is Christ who deprives him of the papacy authoritatively.
Of these two [intermediate]
explanations, Azorius (2, tom. 2, cap. 7) adopts the first, which holds that
the Church is superior to the Pope in the case of heresy; while Cajetan adopts
the latter and treats of it at length. Bellarmine, however, reports
his [Cajetan’s] opinion and attacks it in his work de Romano pontifice,
bk. 2, ch. 20, objecting especially to these two points: namely, that Cajetan
says that the Pope who is a manifest heretic is not ipso facto deposed;
and also that the Church deposes the Pope in a real and authoritative
manner. Suarez also, in the disputation that we have frequently cited,
sect. 6, num. 7, attacks Cajetan for saying that, in the case of heresy, the
Church is superior to the Pope, not insofar as he is Pope, but insofar as he is
a private individual. Cajetan, however, did not say this; he only
said that, even in the case of heresy, the Church is not absolutely superior to
the Pope, but instead is superior to the bond between the papacy and the
person, dissolving it in the same way that she forged it at his election; and
this power of the Church is ministerial, for only Christ our Lord is
superior to the Pope without qualification. Hence, Bellarmine and Suarez
are of the opinion that, by the very fact that the Pope is a manifest heretic and
declared to be incorrigible, he is deposed by Christ our Lord without any
intermediary, and not by any authority of the Church.
The opinion of Cajetan, then, is
contained in these three propositions. The first is that it is not
precisely the fact of heresy, as such, that deprives a heretical Pope of the
papacy and deposes him. The second is that, even in the case of heresy,
the Church has no power or superiority over the Pope in relation to his papal
power (as if there were a power superior to that one, even in such a case), for
the power of the Church is in no way superior to that of the Pope; and
consequently her power is not superior to the Pope [himself] without
qualification. The third is that the authority of the Church has for its
object the application of the power of the Pope (form) to a given person
(matter), by designating that person by election; and the separation of this
power from the person, by declaring him to be a heretic and as one to be
avoided [vitandus] by the faithful (declarando illum pro
haeretico, et evitando a fidelibus). And so, because the declaration of his
crime works like an antecedent disposition, preceding the deposition itself, it
relates to the deposition only ministerially; nevertheless it also reaches the
form itself dispositively and ministerially, insofar as it causes the
disposition, and thereby indirectly (mediately) influences the form; for just
as in the generation and corruption of a man, the begetter neither produces nor
educes [develops] the form (the soul), nor does the corruptor (disease, etc.)
destroy the form, but accomplishes the coming together (of the form and
matter), or the separation (of the form from the matter) by way of acting
immediately (directly) on the dispositions of matter, and by this means reaches
the form mediately (indirectly).
That Cajetan’s first proposition is
true is evident from what we have already said; nor does Bellarmine attack it
legitimately. And the truth of it is certain, both because the Pope, no
matter how truly and publicly he be a heretic, cannot be deposed if he is ready
to be corrected, as we have said above; nor does Divine Law give the Church the
power to depose him, for she neither can nor ought to avoid him; for the
Apostle says, “Avoid a heretic after the first and second admonition”;
consequently, before he has been admonished a first and second time, he is not
to be avoided by the Church; neither, then, is he to be deposed. So it is
false to say that the Pope is deposed by the very fact that he is a public
heretic; for it is possible for him to be a public heretic while he has not yet
been admonished by the Church, nor declared to be incorrigible; and also because,
as Azorius notes well in the place referenced above, no bishop loses his
jurisdiction and episcopal power ipso facto, no matter how much of an
external heretic he may be, until the Church declares him such and deposes him;
and this is true despite the fact that he incurs excommunication ipso facto;
for only those who are excommunicated as non tolerati [i.e., vitandi]
lose their jurisdiction—which is to say, those who have been excommunicated by
name, or who are manifest strikers of the clergy; so, if no bishop (or any
other prelate) loses his power ipso facto solely from external heresy,
why would the Pope lose it before a declaration is given by the
Church—especially because the Pope cannot incur excommunication? For, as I
presume, there is no excommunication that is immediately incurred because of
Divine Law; but the Pope cannot be excommunicated by any human law, since he is
above all human law.
[What follows proves that JST was
not a Conciliarist]
Cajetan’s second proposition is
proved from the fact that the power of the Pope, without any qualification, is
a power derived from Christ our Lord, and not from the Church; and to that
power Christ subjected the whole Church, that is, all the faithful without any
restriction—as is certain de fide, and has been proven at length
already; therefore, in no case can the Church have a power superior to that of
the pope—unless there is a case in which the Pope’s power becomes dependent
upon the Church and inferior to her; but, by the very fact that it becomes
inferior in such a case, it is already altered and is not the same power as
before—since beforehand it was superior to the whole Church and independent of
her, and yet in this [supposed] case becomes dependent and inferior. It
is never verified, then, that the Church has a power that is formally superior
to that of the Pope; for it is necessary, in order for the Church to have, in
some case, a power superior to the Pope’s, that the Pope’s power be formally
different from what it had been previously, for [in such a hypothetical case]
it is not full and supreme in the way that it was before. Nor does any
authority give us certainty that Christ our Lord gave a power to the Church in
this way, so that her power would be superior to the Pope’s; for the things
that are said about the case of heresy do not indicate any formal superiority
over the power of the Pope, but only that the Church avoids him, separates
herself from him, refuses to communicate with him, etc. Nor can any
foundation be construed to the contrary by saying that Christ our Lord (who
gave, without any restriction, supreme and independent power to Peter and to
his See) determined that, in the case of heresy, the Pope’s power would be
dependent upon, and inferior to, the power of the Church formally as such, so
that his power would be subordinated to that of the Church, and not superior as
before.
As to Cajetan’s second proposition,
namely, that the Church does not have any power superior to the Pope; if it be
taken without qualification, it has already been proved at length; for the
Church ought to be subject to the Pope; nor is the Pope’s power derived from
the Church, as political power; but it comes immediately from Christ, whom the
Pope represents. But it is also evident that, even in the case of heresy,
the power of the Church is not superior to the Pope, inasmuch as we are
concerned with the papal power; firstly, because the power of the Pope is in no
case derived from and originating from the Church, but from Christ; therefore
in no case is the power of the Church superior; also, because the power of the
Pope, inasmuch as it is derived from Christ, was instituted as being supreme
over all the power of the Church that is on earth (as was proven above from
many authorities); but Christ our Lord did not make any exception, as if there
were a case in which that power would be limited and subjected to another; but
always and in respect to all He speaks of it as supreme and monarchical.
But when He mentions the case of heresy He does not attribute to the Church any
superiority over the Pope, but only commands her to avoid, separate herself
from, and not communicate with one who is a heretic; but none of these indicate
any superiority, and they can be observed without claiming anything of the
sort. The power of the Church, therefore, is not superior to the power of
the Pope, even in the case of heresy. Even the canons confirm this: for
they say that the first See is judged by no one; and this holds true even in
the case of infidelity, since the Fathers who were gathered in the case of Pope
Marcellinus said to him: “You must judge yourself.”
The third proposition follows from
the two preceding. The Church is able to declare the crime of the pontiff
and, according to divine law, propose him to the faithful as one who must be
avoided, according to the manner in which heretics should be avoided [Titus
3:10]. And the Pope who is to be avoided, as a consequence of this disposition,
is necessarily rendered incapable of being the head of the Church, since he is
a member to be avoided by her, and consequently unable to exercise an influx on
her;
The Church is able to declare the
crime of the pontiff and, according to divine law, propose him to the faithful
as one who must be avoided, according to the manner in which heretics should be
avoided [Titus 3:10]. And the Pontiff, by the fact of having to be avoided, is
necessarily rendered impotent by the force of such a declaration, since a Pope
who must to be avoided is unable to influence the Church as its head.
Therefore, by virtue of such a power [the power to avoid that the heretic must
be avoided], the Church dissolves ministerially and dispositively the bond
joining the pontificate with such a person. The consequence is clear: for
when an agent has the power to induce a disposition in a subject, and the
disposition is such that the separation of the form necessarily follows from it
(since the form cannot remain with this disposition in the subject), the agent
has power over the dissolution of the form, and mediately touches the form
itself as having to be separated from the subject—not as having to be destroyed
in itself, as is evident in the agent that corrupts a man; for the agent does
not destroy the form of the man, but induces the dissolution of the form by
placing in the matter a disposition that is incompatible with the form.
Therefore, because the Church has the power to declare that the Pope is to be
avoided, she is able to introduce into his person a disposition that is
incompatible with the papacy; and thus the papacy is dissolved ministerially
and dispositively by the Church, but authoritatively by Christ; even as, in
designating him through his election, she gives him the last disposition needed
for him to receive the papacy that Christ our Lord bestows upon him, and thus
she creates a Pope in a ministerial way.
And if Cajetan sometimes says that
the Church has power authoritatively over the conjunction of the papacy with
the person, and its separation from him, but that she has power ministerially
over the papacy itself, he is to be understood in this way: he means that the
Church has the authority to declare the crime of the Pope, even as she has the
authority to designate him as Pope [by papal election]; and what is
authoritative in respect to the declaration is dispositive and ministerial in
relation to the form as having to be joined to him or separated from him; for,
absolutely and of herself, the Church has no power over the form itself [of the
papacy], since the power [of the papacy] is not subordinated to her.
By understanding things in this way,
we can reconcile the different canons, which sometimes say that the deposition
of the Pope pertains to God alone, and sometimes that he can be judged by his
inferiors in the case of heresy; for it is true both that the ejection or
deposition of the Pope is reserved to God alone, as the authoritative and
principal agent, as is said expressly in the chapter Ejectionem,
distinction 79, and in many other canons cited above, which say that God has
reserved the judgment of the Apostolic See to himself alone; and also that the
Church judges the Pope ministerially and dispositively by declaring the crime
and proposing the Pope as someone who is to be avoided, as we read in the
chapter Si papa, distinction 40, and the chapter Oves, 2 question
7.
The arguments of Bellarmine and
Suarez against the foregoing opinion [of Cajetan] are easily refuted. For
Bellarmine objects that the Apostle says that a heretic is to be avoided after two corrections, that
is, after he manifestly appears to be pertinacious; and that happens before any excommunication or judicial
sentence, as Jerome comments, for heretics depart from the body of
Christ of their own accord [per se]. And his reasoning is this: a
non-Christian cannot be Pope (for he cannot be the head who is not a member);
but the heretic is not a Christian, as the Fathers commonly teach; therefore,
the manifest heretic cannot be Pope. Nor can one respond that he still
has the [baptismal] character; for, if he remained Pope because of this
character, it will never be possible to depose him, as this character is
indelible. Wherefore, the Fathers—such as Cyprian, Jerome, and
Ambrose—teach with one accord that heretics lack all jurisdiction and power by
reason of their heresy, and that this is so independently of any
excommunication.
I respond that the heretic is to be
avoided after two admonitions; that is, after two admonitions made legally and
by the authority of the Church, and not
according to private judgment; for, if it sufficed for this admonition to
be made by a private individual—and if his manifest heresy had not been
declared by the Church, nor the pope proposed to all as one that must be
avoided – that the faithful would nevertheless be obliged to avoid
him, great confusion would follow in the Church; for the heresy of the Pope cannot be public in respect to all the
faithful, unless others relate it to them; but such [private] reports,
since they are not juridical, cannot claim everyone’s belief or oblige them to
avoid the Pope: hence, just as the Church, by designating the man, proposed him
juridically to all as the elected Pope, so too, it is necessary that she
depose him by declaring him a heretic and proposing him as one to be
avoided. Hence, we see from the practice of the Church that this is how
it has been done; for, in the case of the deposition of a Pope, his cause was
handled in a general Council before he was considered not to be Pope, as we
have related above. It is not true, then, that the Pope ceases to be Pope
by the very fact that he is a heretic, even a public one, before any sentence
of the Church and before she proposes
him to the faithful as one who is to be avoided.
Nor does Jerome exclude the judgment
of the Church (especially in so grave a matter as the deposition of a Pope)
when he says that a heretic departs from the body of Christ of his own accord [per
se]; rather, he is judging the quality of the crime, which of its very
nature [per se] excludes one from the Church—provided that the crime is
declared by the Church—without the need for any superadded censure; for,
although heresy separates one from the Church by its very nature [per se],
nevertheless, this separation is not thought to have been made, as far as we
are concerned [quoad nos], without that declaration. Likewise, we
respond to his reasoning in this way: one who is not a Christian, both in
himself and in relation to us [quoad se et quoad nos], cannot be Pope;
however, if in himself he is not a Christian (because he has lost the faith)
but in relation to us has not yet been juridically declared as an infidel or
heretic (no matter how manifestly he be such according to private judgment), he
is still a member of the Church as far as we are concerned; and consequently he
is its head. It is necessary, therefore, to have the judgment of the
Church, by which he is proposed to us as someone who is not a Christian, and
who is to be avoided; and at that point he ceases to be Pope in relation to us
[quoad nos]; and we further conclude that he had not ceased to be Pope
before [the declaration], even in himself, since all of his acts were valid in
themselves. [This last sentence is directed against the minority opinion which
maintains that a heretical Pope will cease to be pope, ispo facto,
before human judgment, while admitting that he will retain his jurisdiction
until he is declared deposed by the Church. JST responds by saying, if
his acts of jurisdiction remain valid it is because he has remain the true
pope, not only in relation to us (quoad nos), but in himself.]
The second objection is this: the
Church cannot have power over the bond between the papacy and the person
without having power over the papacy itself; for neither does the Pope, when he
deposes a bishop, do anything more than destroy the bond between him and his
episcopacy—for he does not destroy the episcopacy itself; therefore, if the
Church has power over the bond that exists between the papacy and the person,
consequently she has power over both the papacy and the person of the Pope.
[Supporting Argument] And this
reasoning is confirmed by the fact that the Pope is deposed against his will,
and therefore is penalized in such a deposition; but to inflict a penalty is
proper to a superior and a judge; therefore the Church, when she deposes a
Pope—that is, inflicts on him the penalty of deposition—has superiority over
the person of the Pope.
Finally, he who has power over both
the parts—that is, over their conjunction—has power in an unqualified sense
over the whole, even as one who generates a man has power in an unqualified
sense over the whole man; therefore, if the Church has power over the
conjunction of the papacy with the person, she has power over the Pope in an
unqualified sense, contrary to Cajetan’s assertion.
I respond that the Church, when she
deposes a Pope, does not have power over him in the same way as the Pope has
power over a bishop when he deposes him; for the Pope, in depriving a bishop of
his episcopacy, acts on him as one who is subject to him, and whose power is
subordinated to him and dependent on him, and which he can limit and constrain;
hence, although he removes the episcopacy from the person without destroying
the episcopacy, nevertheless, he takes it away by reason of his superiority
over the person (even in respect to the power that the person has, since the
same is subordinate to him); and because of this he moves the power away from
the person, and not just the person away from the power. The Church,
however, takes away the papacy, not because she has any superiority over that
power, but rather through the ministerial and dispositive power by which she is
able to induce a disposition [in the person of the Pope] that is incompatible
with the papacy, in the way explained above.
As to the supporting argument, I respond
that the Pope is deposed against his will ministerially and dispositively by
the Church, but authoritatively by Christ our Lord; hence it is by Christ, and
not by the Church, that he is punished in the proper sense.
To the last argument, I say that he
who has power over the conjunction of the parts has power over the whole in an
unqualified sense; but this is not the case if he has a merely ministerial and
dispositive power over such a conjunction—unless we are discussing natural
bodies, in which the physical dispositions have a natural connection with the
very being of the whole; for, when an agent communicates being to a natural
body by producing dispositions that unite its parts, it produces the whole
natural body in an unqualified sense; but because in moral beings the
disposition has only a moral connection with the form, and this connection is
because of a voluntary institution, he who disposes the moral being is not
considered to produce the whole being in an unqualified sense and authoritatively,
but as it were ministerially. This is comparable to how, if the Pope were
to grant someone the power to determine which places have privileges of gaining
indulgences and which do not, the designation that this person makes would not
take away or grant the indulgences principally and authoritatively, but only
ministerially.
[1]
This quotation from Pope Clement is discussed by Suarez, Cajetan, Almain and
many others. Modern authors, being unable to locate the quotation, have
assumed that it never existed. However, they were looking in the wrong
place. The quotation is not found in Pope Clements first Epistle to the
Corinthians, as most have assumed, but in his first epistle to James. We
have located the quotation and present it now. The following words are
those of St. Peter to Clement, who St. Peter had chosen to be his successor: “Nor
did Christ wish to establish you as the judge or advocate of secular affairs,
lest being choked with the cares of men, you are unable to devote yourself to
the Word of God and, according to the rule of truth, distinguish (secernere)
good from evil. (…) If indeed you were occupied with worldly concerns, you
would both deceive yourself and those who hear you, being unable to distinguish
those things that pertain to salvation more fully than others. From this it
could happen that, for not teaching those things that pertain to salvation, you
could be deposed (deponaris), and the disciples could perish through
ignorance.” (First Epistle of Clement to James, Ex Officina Bernhardi
Tauchnitz, Lipsiae, 1863, p. 32)
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