Before getting
into a discussion regarding the canonical status of the SSPX, I think a brief
overview of its origins and development is in order. The SSPX was formally
erected as a provisional pious union
on November 1st, 1970 by Bishop François Charrière, which is
equivalent to today’s association of the faithful.
The SSPX lost its juridic status on May 6th, 1975 after Charrière’s
successor, Bishop Pierre Mamie, suppressed the society in response to Marcel
Lefebvre’s 1974 declaration,
which essentially accuses the Second Vatican Council of heresy. According to
canonist Fr. John Lessard-Thibodeau,
The juridic personality the SSPX
gained upon its erection 01 November 1970 was lost on 06 May 1975 when it was
suppressed [cf. canon 120.1 of the 1983 CIC]. Consequently lacking juridic
personality, the SSPX does not exist juridically and thus has no canonical
status. Since a juridic person comes into existence either de iure or by decree of competent authority (c. 114), the mere fact
that the SSPX has cohesion and self-declared
leadership does not constitute them as a juridic person. As such, the SSPX is de facto an organized consortium of Catholics, but it is not de iure a Catholic organization.
On July 22nd of 1976,
Lefebvre incurred the penalty of suspension a
divinis after the ordination of several priests and deacons on June 29th
of the same year.
On June 30th, 1988 Marcel
Lefebvre proceeded with the consecration of four bishops, despite receiving
several warnings beforehand. As a result, he incurred a latae sententiae excommunication alongside those who he
consecrated.
Prior
to the promulgation of the 1983 Code of
Canon Law, canon 953 of the 1917 CIC
required the approval of the Roman Pontiff for episcopal consecrations. Canon
2370 also inflicted the penalty of suspension ipso jure (by the law itself) on those who consecrated bishops
without papal approval. Additionally, those who received ordination from
excommunicated bishops incurred ipso
facto suspension reserved to the Holy See. Canon 2372 of the 1917 CIC states:
Those who receive orders
from one who is excommunicated, suspended, or interdicted by a declaratory or
condemnatory sentence, or from a notorious apostate, heretic, or schismatic,
contract ipso facto a suspension a divinis reserved to the Apostolic See.
Be he who in good faith is ordained by any of the above mentioned persons lacks
the exercise of the order so received until he is dispensed.
On
April 9th, 1951 the Holy Office changed the censure to a latae sententiae excommunication
reserved specially to the Holy See.
A bishop of any rite or
dignity whatever who confers episcopal consecration on a cleric who has not
been nominated by the Holy See, or expressly confirmed by the same, and also
the person who received such consecration, even if impelled by grave fear, are
subject ipso facto to excommunication
reserved specialissimo modo to the
Holy See.
Theologians usually
distinguish between two kinds of schism: pure and mixed schism. Schism is
defined by Canon 1325,
§2
of the 1917 CIC as the refusal to be
subject to the Roman Pontiff or be in communion with members of the Church
subject to him. Mixed schism entails a combination of both heresy and schism.
The case of the SSPX is unique since they don’t profess any heresy; although an
argument can be made that some of their positions are rash or even proximate to
heresy.
Members of the SSPX
usually try to avert the accusation of schism by claiming that they accept the
authority of the Roman Pontiff and submit to his legitimate doctrinal and
disciplinary decrees. They will simply argue that they are morally bound to
recognize and resist heresy and the abuse of authority. In this particular
case, they accuse the Second Vatican Council of teaching heresy, and Paul VI of
acting outside his legitimate authority in the promulgation of the Novus Ordo Missae. Although not strictly
defined, dogmatic theologian Joseph Pohle gives the theological note of “certa”
to the thesis that the Church has authority to institute entirely new
liturgical rites.
Theologians usually assign the censure of “rash” to the contradictory position.
Likewise, the implicit
accusation that the entire college of bishops, with the exception of a few,
could fall into or be suspect of heresy is proximate to heresy since it
implicitly denies the indefectibility of the Episcopal college. That the entire
body of bishops cannot be suspect of heresy is required by the formal
visibility of the Church,
which states that the Church instituted by Christ must express the four marks
in such a way as to give one moral certainty that this is the true Church of
Christ. One of the four marks is apostolicity which can be subdivided into
apostolicity of doctrine and government. One cannot reasonably conclude that
the Church has retained apostolicity of doctrine if the entire body of bishops
adheres at least implicitly through its union with the Pope to heretical doctrine.
In any
event, the sheer fact that one claims adherence to the Papal office and
magisterium doesn’t excuse one from the delict of schism. One may also be a
schismatic indirectly by his actions. As canonist Fr. Ignatius Szal notes,
Strictly
considered, a schismatic professes belief in the sovereign power and primacy of
the Pope, but out of malice refuses to be subject to him and to obey him as the
Head of the Church and the Vicar of Christ on earth. Such schism is called pure
schism.
To
constitute the delict of schism in the strict sense, the following conditions
are required:
1)
One must withdraw directly (expressly) or indirectly (by means of one’s
actions) from obedience to the Roman Pontiff, and separate oneself from
ecclesiastical communion with the rest of the faithful, even though one does
not join a separate schismatical sect;
2)
one’s withdrawal must be made with obstinacy and rebellion;
3)
the withdrawal must be made in relation to those things by which the unity of
the Church is constituted; and
4)
despite this formal disobedience the schismatic must recognize the Roman
Pontiff as the true pastor of the Church, and he must profess as an article of
faith that obedience is due the Roman Pontiff.
The consecration of bishops in direct defiance of papal
orders is per se a schismatic act, since it entails the creation of another
magisterium. The schismatic nature of Lefebvre’s 1988 consecrations was noted
by John Paul II in his letter to Lefebvre. JP II writes,
With a paternal heart, but with all
the gravity required by the present circumstances, I exhort you, Reverend
Brother, not to embark upon a course which, if persisted in, cannot but appear
as a schismatical act whose inevitable theological and
canonical consequences are known to you. I earnestly invite you to return, in
humility, to full obedience to Christ’s Vicar.
Although
the excommunications were lifted in 2009 by Pope Benedict XVI, that doesn’t negate
the schismatic nature of Lefebvre’s actions, or the continued ordination of SSPX
priests. All of the SSPX clergy remain suspended a divinis without any legitimate ministry in the Church. Members of
the SSPX also continue refuse to be subject to their local bishops in
disciplinary matters, as well as refuse to commune with fellow Catholics in the
ordinary form of the Mass. In conclusion, we have legitimate grounds for
assuming that the SSPX is schismatic properly speaking and not merely
disobedient.
The SSPX usually appeal to the principle of epikeia to argue in favor for the 1988
consecrations and the continued ordination of priests. This principle
essentially states that when the law of the Church becomes harmful to the
public welfare, those laws no longer remain binding (at least temporarily). As
canonists John Abbo and Jerome Hannan note,
A
law ceases to exist when it ceases to be reasonable; for then its whole purpose
of promoting the welfare of the community is defeated. This occurs in two ways:
when the law becomes useless (negatively) and when the law becomes harmful
(positively). In both ways, law ceases intrinsically. If not the whole purpose,
but only the partial purpose of the law is defeated, the law survives.
Moreover, even though the purpose of the law should cease absolutely but only
in respect to certain provisions of the law, the latter would survive as to
those portions still motivated by an adequate purpose.
However, their appeal to epikeia would only be justifed if the
SSPX could demonstrate that the Novus
Ordo Missae was illicitly promulgated. To establish this point, adherents
of the SSPX argue that the promulgation of the Novus Ordo Missae by Paul VI is in direct violation of canon 13 of
the seventh session of Trent and the apostolic constitution Quo Primum of Pius V.
1.
Canon
13 of the Seventh Session of Trent
The most common objection
raised against the liceity of the Novus
Ordo Missae is based on the 13th canon of the seventh session of
Trent, which forbids pastors from tampering with the ceremonies surrounding the
sacraments. The canon reads:
If anyone says that the received
and approved rites of the Catholic Church, accustomed to be used in the
administration of the sacraments, may be despised or omitted by the ministers
without sin and at their pleasure, or may be changed by any pastor of the
churches to other new ones, let him be anathema.
There are generally two arguments adduced from this
canon: (1) the term “pastor” extends to the pope; and (2) that the Church does
not have the authority to institute entirely new liturgical rites surrounding
the Eucharist. I will address the second objection first. The term “rites”
refers to all the ceremonies surrounding the Sacraments, not merely the
Eucharist. This is evident from John Calvin’s Antidote,
What they mean by the received and
approved Rites of the Church every one is aware. Hence by this caveat they
establish whatever superstitions human presumption has superinduced on the pure
ordinances of the Lord. The genuine rite of Baptism is simple, and the
administration of the Supper simple, if we look to what the Lord has enjoined.
In other words, the term “rites” in the 13th
canon is equivalent to the more generic term “sacramentals.” No Catholic, of
course, would deny that the Church has authority to institute entirely new
sacramentals. Such would be in violation of canon 1145 of the 1917 CIC. In his commentary on canon 1145,
Fr. Charles Augustine notes,
The Apostolic See alone can
institute Sacramentals,
authentically interpret those in use, or abolish or change some of them. This
is not a dogma, as the Council of
Trent has not defined this power directly, but only negatively
determined that the rites
accompanying the administration of the Sacraments may not be arbitrarily
condemned, omitted, or changed. Our
text claims the exclusive power of instituting Sacramentals for the Holy See.
This is not surprising if we remember the general saying: Lex orandi, lex
credendi. The Sacramentals are the living expression of the faith and hope that
is in the Church. However, this does not mean that no Sacramentals were
instituted without the concurrence of the Apostolic See. For more than one of
them, especially the rites surrounding the administration of Baptism, are
undoubtedly of Apostolic origin. This explains why the Holy See has
consistently refused to depart from such practices as anointings, spittle,
breathing, even among nations who were opposed to these rites. The legislative
and ministerial power of the Church alone can declare which rites by their
external sign signify the blessing or favor that God wishes to bestow.
Dogmatic theologian Fr. Joseph Pohle also understands the term “rites” in the 13th canon to refer to sacramentals. He writes,
Thesis
IV: Though the Church has no right to
institute Sacraments, she possesses the power to institute sacramentals.
This
proposition may be qualified as "certa"
Proof.
In the three preceding theses we have explained what the Church cannot do in
regard to the Sacraments. The present one defines what she can do.
There
are two kinds of sacramentals: (1) such as accompany the administration of the
Sacraments (e. g. the exorcisms pronounced in Baptism, the use of salt, the
anointing of the forehead), and (2) such as may be used independently of the
Sacraments and have a quasi matter and form of their own (e. g. the different
ecclesiastical blessings). The former are called sacramental ceremonies, the
latter sacramentals in the strict sense of the term.
1.
That the Church has power to
institute sacramental ceremonies or rites, is clear from the following
declaration of the Tridentine Council:
"If anyone saith that the received and approved rites of the Catholic
Church, wont to be used in the solemn administration of the Sacraments, may be
contemned, or without sin be omitted at pleasure by the ministers, or be
changed by every pastor of the churches into other new ones, let him be
anathema."
a)
In proof of this dogma the Holy Synod adduces the example of St. Paul, who concludes his remarks on the
Eucharist with these words: "And the rest I will set in order,
when I come." There is abundant Patristic evidence for the antiquity of
the sacramental ceremonies employed by the Church. Most of those now in use can
be traced far beyond the ninth century, as a glance at the Sacramentary of
Gregory the Great and the writings of Rhabanus Maurus, Alcuin, and Isidore
shows. In the early days of Christianity different ceremonies were in vogue, as
may be gathered from the works of Tertullian.
The theological argument for our
thesis rests mainly on the fact that the Church possesses legislative power to
ordain whatever she judges fit to beautify her services and promote the
salvation of souls. The
sacramental ceremonies serve both these purposes by giving visible expression
to the ideas that underlie the sacred mysteries of religion, and by
stimulating, nourishing, and augmenting the devotion of the faithful.
In fact, the Council of Trent explicitly affirmed
its authority to institute entirely new liturgies surrounding the Eucharist in
the twenty-first session. The Council declares:
Chapter II: The power of the
Church as regards the dispensation of the Sacrament of the Eucharist.
It furthermore declares, that this
power has ever been in the Church, that, in the dispensation of the sacraments,
their substance being untouched,
it may ordain, or change, what things
soever it may judge most expedient, for the profit of those who
receive, or for the veneration of the said sacraments, according to the
difference of circumstances, times, and places.
The
Council of Trent’s catechism clarifies that the substance of the sacrament refers
strictly to the matter and form of the sacrament. The Catechism states:
In the first place, then, it
should be explained that the sensible thing which enters into the definition of
a Sacrament as already given, although constituting but one sign, is twofold.
Every Sacrament consists of two things, matter, which is called the element,
and form, which is commonly called the word.
…
These, then, are the parts which
belong to the nature and substance of the Sacraments, and of which every
Sacrament is necessarily composed.
To (the matter and form) are added
certain ceremonies. These cannot be omitted without sin, unless in case of
necessity; yet, if at any time they be omitted, the Sacrament is not thereby
invalidated, since the ceremonies do not pertain to its essence. It is not
without good reason that the administration of the Sacraments has been at all
times, from the earliest ages of the Church, accompanied with certain solemn
rites.
…
What has been said on the matter
and form, which are required for the essence of the Sacrament, will be found
sufficient for the instruction of the faithful…
This also undermines the first objection regarding
the term “pastors” applying to the pope.
Clearly, canon 13 was forbidding local priests and bishops from
tampering with the liturgical ceremonies surrounding the sacraments. It nowhere
denies the Supreme Pontiff from doing so. To properly interpret the 13th
canon we need to understand its historical context and purpose. According to
late 19th century theologian Fr. John Hogan (1829 – 1901), the 13th
canon was issued by the Council to address protestant objections concerning the
Church’s authority not only in instituting new liturgical rites but also its
ability to bind consciences in liturgical matters. He writes,
Protestantism, as we know, was a
revolt against the whole organization and outward life of the Church. Her
sacramental rites were almost entirely thrust aside, with their underlying
doctrines, by the first so called reformers; and in what they retained of them,
the instructive and beautiful ceremonial of Christian ages gave way to a cold
and lifeless ritual. It was in
opposition to this that the Council of Trent formulated the 13th Canon of its
7th Session.
Fr. James O'Kane’s (1825 – 1874) adds, “It is
evident that to maintain the proposition condemned by the canon of Trent would
be implicitly to maintain that the Church has not power to institute ceremonies
or require their observance under pain of sin, which is an error in faith.”
For anyone that disputes this point, I submit to you none other than the
interpretation of St. Robert Bellarmine. He writes,
The Ceremonies instituted
by the Church cannot be omitted without sin,
even without scandal. This depends upon another question, whether Ecclesiastical laws oblige in conscience. We
disputed on that point in On the Roman
Pontiff, book 4, ch. 15 et seqq. The particular reason is from Paul in
Romans 13:1-2, “There is no power except from God, moreover, those things which
have been ordained by God, therefore he who resists the power of God resists
the ordination of God, while he that resists Him acquires damnation.” And in v.
5, “Therefore, out of necessity be subject, not only on account of wrath, but
even on account of conscience.” Such a teaching, even if the Apostle applies it
to princes in particular times, when he added in verse 4, “If you do badly,
fear, for he carries a sword without cause;” nevertheless, the general teaching
is on all those having power, as Calvin concedes in The Institutes, 4,10 § 5,
and it is clear from those words in verse 1, There is no power but from God.
For that very proposition is equivalent to this, All power is from God. Moreover,
in the Church it cannot be denied that there is a certain power of those that
have been put before others, since in Scripture it says, “He that is in charge
in solicitude ( Romans 12:8), and “I write these things while I am absent so
that when I am present I will not deal with you more harshly according to the
power which the Lord gave to me.” (2 Corinthians 13:10). Or again, “Obey those
that have been put over you.” (Hebrews 13:17). Therefore, it is effected that he that does not preserve the laws of
the Church will sin in conscience. All these things show it: “They resist
the ordinances of God; they acquire damnation for themselves, be subject from
necessity; not only on account of wrath, but also on account of conscience.”
(See loc. cit.) But in particular, that
ceremonies are not all of free observance is proven from the fact that grave
conflicts arose in the Church on account of ceremonies, and laws were
imposed under the severest penalties in regard to ceremonies, and at length
they were held as heretics who did not obey. Such are all the manifest
arguments that this matter is not free: for conflicts do not come about from
matters that are free.
In the section quoted above, Bellarmine cites his
treatise On the Roman Pontiff. For
the sake of posterity, I will reproduce the relevant section here:
So
far we have proven that the Supreme Pontiff is a judge of controversies which
arise in the Church and that he is certain and infallible in his judgment. Now
follows the third question:
Whether
the Supreme Pontiff can compel the faithful to believe or do that which he has
judged. The same thing is understood about other bishops, save for proportion.
But before we come either to our arguments or those of our adversaries, it will
be worthwhile to record a few things on the state of the question, as well as
the opinion of our adversaries.
Therefore,
first it must be noted that we do not speak about the Pope as a temporal prince
of a certain province. In this manner, it is certain that he can impose laws on
his subjects and also turn to them with the sword. The heretics do not deny
this in regard to the arrangement wherein the Pope is a temporal prince,
although they deny it is fitting for him to exercise such a rule. We will speak
more on that matter in the next book. Therefore, now we only treat on the
Pontiff as he is the Pontiff of the whole Catholic Church. Moreover, we ask
whether he may have true power over all the faithful in spiritual matters just
as temporal kings have in temporal affairs, to the extent that, just as they
can make civil laws, so also the Pope
can make ecclesiastical laws truly obliging in conscience as well as punish transgressors
with spiritual penalties at least, such as excommunication, suspension,
interdict, irregularity, etc. We will treat on temporal or civil power which
the Pope has either directly or indirectly in the following book. At present we
are only discussing the spiritual or ecclesiastical, whose end is eternal life.
…
Lastly, it must be noted
that the opinion that teaches there is no authority in the Church to make laws
that oblige the faithful in conscience pleases many heretics.
So formerly the Waldenses thought, as St. Antoninus attests. Marsilius of Padua
taught the same thing in a book titled Defender of Peace, against which Albert
Pighius wrote; John Wycliffe taught the same thing, from where it was gathered
that the decretals of the Popes were apocryphal, and only stupid men devoted
themselves to recognizing them. Jan Hus later taught the same thing, as John de
Wessalia notes in a little book on his condemnation that was made at Moguntium,
in 1479, the first of which was that the prelates of the Church could not make
a law which obliges in conscience but could only exhort men to keep the
commandments of God.
Thereafter
in our own times, all Lutherans and Calvinists teach the same thing. Above all
Luther in his book On the Babylonian Captivity, in the chapter on Baptism: “By
what right does the Pope constitute laws over us? Who gave him the power of
placing the liberty that was given to us through Baptism captive, when neither
the Pope nor a bishop nor any man should have the right to constitute one
syllable over a true Christian unless it were done by the consent of the same.”
He teaches similar things in his book on Christian liberty, which Iodocus
Clicthouseus refutes, as well as John of Rochester [Fisher] in his attack on
the assertion of article 27. Yet Luther most vehemently treats it in his
explication of the vision of Daniel, and that he might condemn ecclesiastical
laws even by his deeds, in the year 1520 he publicly burned the whole body of
canon law, as John Cochlaeus writes in the life of Luther.
Melanchthon
teaches the same thing in the Augsburg Confession and in his defense of the
same; so does Calvin; the opinion of all of them is nearly the same, and can be
reduced to certain headings.
1)
They teach that bishops and hence even the Pope can constitute a certain order
in the Church to preserve useful discipline, such as to define on what day men
should go to church, who should sing the Psalms and how, or the Scriptures that
must be read in the Church, etc.; but still, such constitutions do not oblige
in conscience, except by reason of scandal, so that one would be free to keep
or not keep these laws in a manner without scandal to others. But the Pope or
bishops cannot constitute any true law which is not expressly in Scripture.
2)
They teach that not only can the Pope or bishops not make a new law, but
neither can they compel Christians to keep the law of God by a command from
authority. Even if it occurs in the form of judgment in proceeding against
transgressors, still they can only resort to exhortation, advice and rebuke to
make men preserve the law of God.
3)
They teach that while there is a power of excommunicating in the Church (that
is, of rejecting incorrigible men from the body), nevertheless, they do not
mean this power is in the Pope or the bishop per se, but only in the Church,
which for them means the body of ministers along with the consent of the
people. This should not be a wonder, since they deny the Pope is greater than a
bishop, or a bishop greater than a priest in regard to authority. Moreover,
they grant nothing to priests except that they can preach and minister the
Sacraments to those men over whom a secular magistrate commands.
But
in the Catholic Church it has always been believed that bishops over their
dioceses (as well as the Roman Pontiff over the whole Church), are true
ecclesiastical princes, who can impose laws that oblige in conscience, judge in
ecclesiastical cases, and at length, punish by the custom of others—all without
the consensus of the people or the counsel of priests. We will briefly prove
these things.
The 13th canon was never understood as
forbidding the Supreme Pontiff from altering or creating entirely new
liturgical rites. For example, St. Alphonsus Liguori notes in his History on the Council of Trent,
There is no doubt whether the
Church has the power to establish
and change the rites or ceremonies applied in the administration of the
Sacraments, as the Council of Trent itself teaches (Sess. 21, cap. 2).
Nevertheless, this power belongs to the Church alone, which is why it
forbids any other from changing the rites, otherwise, as St. Augustine says
(Epist. 54, alias 118) new things constituted by the ministers would disturb
the order and the common peace of the Church.
Likewise, Italian theologian Giovanni Perrone
(1794-1876) writes,
This definition directly affects
the power whereby the Church was instructed by Christ to institute those things
which concern the administration of the Sacraments, save for their substance
[i.e., form of the sacraments], precisely as this same Council declared (Sess. 21 cap. 2) saying, ‘It
furthermore declares, that this power
has ever been in the Church, that, in the dispensation of the sacraments,
their substance being untouched, it may
ordain, or change, what things soever it may judge most expedient, for the
profit of those who receive, or for the veneration of the said sacraments,
according to the difference of circumstances, times, and places.’ This is why,
in the same way, to scorn the approved and received rites of the Church or to
omit them at one’s pleasure, or to change them into new rites on one’s own
private authority, is also to deny
the power conferred upon the Church by Christ which, which cannot
altogether be done. [Footnote 3]
“(171) That the Church was equipped with this power by Christ is certain: 1)
From the Apostle [Paul], in 1 Cor. 11, when he wrote many things on the
Sacrament of the Eucharist, and he concludes in verse 34, ‘What remains, I will
set in order when I come’.”
Footnote 3:
Here we must note both in regard
to this and in regard to some other theses of this sort, so far as these are on
faith, so much also they contain a fact joined with a right. A fact in the
present proposition is that the rites
or other ceremonies which are taken up in solemn administration of the
Sacraments; certainly these are
neither divinely instituted nor contained in divine revelation. Right is the power conferred upon the
Church by Christ to establish rites or ceremonies of this sort;
moreover, this right is certain from divine revelation. Besides, to deny, scorn or teach that these rites can be omitted
without sin is at least indirectly to attack the very right which is suited to
the Church by divine institution; accordingly this is against the faith.
2. Quo Primum
Neo-traditionalists also frequently cite Pius V’s
apostolic constitution Quo Primum
(1570) in attempt to undermine the liceity of the Novus Ordo Missae. There are generally two arguments adduced from Quo Primum: (1) Pius V explicitly states
that the Roman Missal may not be changed; and (2) that suppressing immemorial
customs is an injustice. Concerning the first point, Pius V writes,
We order and enjoin that nothing
must be added to Our recently published Missal, nothing omitted from it, nor anything
whatsoever be changed within it under the penalty of Our displeasure.
In his article, “What changes were made to the Tridentine
Missal before 1962?” Fr. Aaron Williams lists several changes that were made to
the Roman Missal after the promulgation of Quo
Primum. He notes,
Though Pope Saint Pius V, in his
apostolic constitution Quo Primum, promised the wrath of Saints Peter
and Paul upon anyone who would attempt to change the Missale Romanum of
1570, the Tridentine Missal did in fact undergo many minor (and sometimes even
major) alterations before it reached the 1962 form in use today in the
Extraordinary Form of the Roman Rite.
In 1605, Pope Clement VIII
recognized that in the mere thirty-five years since the publication of the Missale
Romanum many editorial changes were made by independent publishers without
permission, particularly in relation to certain ancient scriptural citations
from the Old Latin versions. Publishers were rendering these texts according to
the official Vulgate edition. Pope Clement ordered that these texts be restored
to their more ancient versions. However, in 1634 Pope Urban VIII reversed this
decision by ordering that scriptural texts in the Missal reflect those of the
Vulgate edition. Though no rubrical changes occurred, he also ordered some
rubrics be re-worded to be more understandable.
No further changes were made to
the Missal itself until 1884 when Pope Leo XIII ordered a revision of the
calendar. By that time, the calendar was becoming so full of feasts that many
saints were being omitted entirely—being superseded by other feasts on the same
day. In addition to the removal of these feasts, Leo XIII also ordered a
restoration of rubrics which, though never changed in the official versions,
were being altered in local printings particularly in France and the
surrounding regions. Leo XIII also established the custom of the traditional
‘Prayers after Low Mass’ which, though not part of the Missal itself, were
nevertheless mandatory.
In 1920, Pope Benedict XV ordered
a major revision of the Breviary and a sizable alteration of the Missal, which
was envisioned by Pope St. Pius X, though never initiated before his death.
This revision included the addition of several feasts, and a rubrical reform of
the calendar, particularly relating to the practice of seasonal commemorations
and the restoration of Lenten ferial days. Other feasts were added in the 20th
century including Christ the King on the last Sunday of October (1925), the
elevation of the Feast of the Sacred Heart to that of a first class (1932), and
the Votive Mass of Our Lord Jesus Christ, Eternal High Priest (1935).
Pope Pius XII made perhaps the
most significant changes with his reform of Holy Week in 1955, but he also
introduced several other feasts including the Assumption, the Immaculate Heart
of Mary, and St. Joseph the Worker. Permission was also given for the usage of
vernacular hymns during low Mass, and the reading of the lections in the
vernacular. And, of course, in 1962, Pope St. John XXIII issued a new edition
of the missal which added the name of St. Joseph to the Roman Canon and removed
the term ‘perfidious’ from the Good Friday intercession for the Jews.
It should also be noted that Pius V issued similar
prohibitions against making changes to the Breviary in his papal bull, Quod a nobis (9 July 1568).
It not only prohibits pastors for altering the breviary, but it also suppresses
all local Breviaries that were not older than two hundred years. Pius V
writes,
Having thus
forbidden to anyone the use of any other, we order that our breviary and form
of praying and chanting be kept in all churches around the world... according
to the custom and rite of the Roman Church, except the aforesaid institution or
custom exceeding two hundred years: stating that this breviary, at any time,
may not be changed in whole or in part, except nothing whatsoever can be added
to it or taken away from it...
In his letter to Archbishop Studium Pio (August 16,
1842), Pope Gregory XVI lists the Breviary as one of the Rites of the Church.
He writes,
Nothing would be more desirable
than to see observed by all those under your care and in every place the
constitutions of Saint Pius V, our Predecessor of immortal memory, who wished
that no one should be dispensed from the obligation of adopting the Breviary
and the Missal published, according to the mind of the Council of Trent for the
use of the Roman Rite, except those who for over two centuries had used a
different Breviary or Missal.
a)
Immemorial Custom
In his apostolic constitution Quo Primum, Pius V permits the usage of
liturgies older than 200 years. He writes,
This new rite alone is to be used
unless approval of the practice of saying Mass differently was given at the
very time of the institution and confirmation of the church by Apostolic See at
least 200 years ago, or unless there has prevailed a custom of a similar kind
which has been continuously followed for a period of not less than 200 years,
in which most cases We in no wise rescind their above-mentioned prerogative or
custom. However, if this Missal, which we have seen fit to publish, be more
agreeable to these latter, We grant them permission to celebrate Mass according
to its rite, provided they have the consent of their bishop or prelate or of
their whole Chapter, everything else to the contrary notwithstanding.
Canon 30 of the 1917 CIC distinguishes three kinds of
customs: particular, centenary and immemorial. Particular customs are those
which have been observed for at least thirty years, centenary customs are those
which have been observed for at least one hundred years, and immemorial customs
are those which have been observed for as long as anyone in the community can
remember. Some argue that the suppression of immemorial customs (in this case
the Usus Antiquior) is an injustice
against the patrimony of the Church. There is a twofold problem with this
argument.
First, in his article,
“Immemorial Custom and the Missale Romanum of 1962,” Fr. Anselm Gribbin argues
that once an immemorial custom has become a universal law it no longer retains
the force of custom. Second, even if the Usus
Antiquior did retain the force of custom, there is nothing preventing the
Church from abrogating it. Canon 5 of the 1917 CIC explicitly states that the Church may revoke even universal and
immemorial customs. The canon reads:
Customs presently in force, whether universal or particular,
but against the prescriptions of these canons, if they are indeed expressly reprobated, are to be
corrected as a corruption of the law, even
if they are immemorial, nor are they permitted to revive in the future;
other customs, clearly centenary or immemorial, can be tolerated if Ordinaries
determine that, due to circumstances of person or place, they cannot be
prudently removed; other customs are considered suppressed, unless the Code
expressly provides otherwise.
That being said, Paul VI never
thought he was replacing the Old Roman Rite with an entirely new one. In his correspondence with Jean Guitton, Paul
VI wrote, “I have kept the canon of St. Pius V in the four canons of the new
liturgy, where it holds the first place.”
Although it can be credibly argued that the revision of the Latin rite under
Paul VI is so extensive that it effectively creates a new rite in all but name,
while suppressing one of the ancient rites of the Church. Even on that
assumption, I see no basis for denying that it is within the competence of the
supreme authority to establish new liturgical forms, as none of the ancient
forms as we know them date to apostolic times. For example, according to some
estimates the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom is 80% new from the Liturgy of St.
James; whereas the Maronite rite, which owes a lot to the Liturgy of St. James,
is basically a new rite created in the 8th century. No one would
argue, however, that these rites are illicit on the basis that they differ
radically from their liturgical predecessors. Although there’s a strong case
that it is a great loss to suppress one of the ancient liturgies for any reason,
but it would be much more difficult to prove that the Church has no authority
to do so. After all, there are undoubtedly many local ancient liturgies that
have been lost to history, being replaced the Byzantine and Roman rites. In any
event, Pope Benedict XVI declared that the old form of the Latin rite should
not be suppressed; indeed that it was never suppressed.
In his correspondence with Paul VI, Jean Guitton
noted that the primary issue with the new missal was not the canons but the
offertory. Neo-traditionalists argue
that the changes made to the offertory essentially entails a rejection of the
sacrificial dimension of the Mass. Ratzinger notes, however, that the
“sacrificial dimension was never located in the Offertory, but in the
Eucharistic Prayer, the Canon.”
He continues by addressing the etymology of the term “Offertory,” which is
derived from the Latin offerre. As Ratzinger notes, “offerre” does not mean to
sacrifice but rather to prepare. The idea was simply that the altar had to be
prepared for the Eucharist. This was seen as an external preparation for what
was to take place.
There have been many
scholars and theologians that have commented on Vatican II’s decree on
religious liberty. Neo-traditionalists argue that there exists a formal
contradiction between Pacem in Terris
and Dignitatis Humanae with previous
magisterial teaching, which supposedly denied the right to religious freedom.
However, in the words of E. William Stokey, “It is
the earlier teaching, rather than the more recent teaching, which is in need of
careful qualification.”
In paragraph 14 of Pacem in Terris, John XXIII taught,
Also among man's rights is that of
being able to worship God in accordance with the right dictates of his own
conscience, and to profess his religion both in private and in public.
According to the clear teaching of Lactantius, “this is the very condition of
our birth, that we render to the God who made us that just homage which is His
due; that we acknowledge Him alone as God, and follow Him. It is from this
ligature of piety, which binds us and joins us to God, that religion derives
its name.''
Although there is nothing definitively taught in Pacem in Terris, I find its teaching on
religious liberty uncontroversial, since it is rooted in two principles taught
by Aquinas himself, viz. – freedom of conscience
and the objective duty to worship God.
According to Thomistic scholar Fr. Dominic Legge,
Aquinas never considers
law, nor justice, nor ius (the object
of justice), as belonging to an individual person abstracted from a wider
teleological order. Rather, a subjective ius
or right is, for Aquinas, always a way of looking at how an individual belongs
to a larger order and is himself teleologically ordered, according to reason,
to a good.
This is true even of the
right to worship God according to one’s conscience, which belongs to
individuals who have the use of reason and free choice. For Aquinas, this right
does not belong to them as pure or absolute individuals, abstracted from the
wider order in which man exists. Rather, that subjective right is itself
another way of expressing how man is ordered to God.
He continues,
On this view, then,
individual rights are not set over against the common good, as if an increase
in the common good necessitated a diminishment of individual liberty. Rather,
that individuals be secure in their liberties as citizens—that they “possess rights”—is
precisely an aspect or dimension of the common good, and the protection of
those rights in law is a means for securing the common good of a just republic.
In all of this, subjective rights are understood as a function of an
overarching order toward a good. To put it another way, rights are important
(or even fundamental and indispensable) precisely because of the overarching
primacy of the common good and the place that each individual has in the order
of the whole.
…
I would like to answer by
summarizing the essentials of what I take to be Thomas’s position. The ius,
or what is due to another, the object of justice, depends, first, on the
overarching order of the cosmos, which is laid out according to God’s wisdom,
and is therefore both intelligible and teleological, and which is composed of
persons endowed with reason and free choice who are members of various
communities that are themselves arranged in hierarchical order. Then, second,
this ius is a function of the relationality that follows from the place
that these persons have in this order. Nor is this order an abstraction: it is the
concrete, particular, historical order in which I find myself. Man comes
into the world as the child of parents, living in a human community, as
a creature under God. He has not himself created or generated this order.
Consequently, man necessarily and inevitably exists in an interlocking web of
relationships, of belonging as a part to other wholes: his family, his clan,
his city, the whole human race, the whole body of Christ, the whole of
creation. These relationships are not constituted by man’s choice. Rather, we
could say that man is naturally and originally in these relationships.
Aquinas’s understanding
of justice, and thus of rights, is therefore quite different from the
Enlightenment and post Enlightenment accounts derived from social contract
theory, which postulate that man exists first as a kind of independent
individual in a primitive “state of nature,” and therefore brings to the
relationships he chooses to enter certain fundamental rights that are, in a
sense, anterior to those relationships. Such theories, whether we are speaking
of Hobbes, Locke, or more recent authors like John Rawls, tend to abstract from
the concrete historical relationships and, we might say, the initial conditions
into which we are in fact born. They aim at developing an account of the basic
or fundamental rights that human beings have purely in virtue of being human,
such that justice becomes, at least in part, granting what is due in virtue of
those rights, and so that individuals can then pursue whatever goods they deem
worthy of their choice.
For Aquinas, in contrast,
the ultimate end of man is not a matter of arbitrary choice, not even for God.
Thee whole plan of divine providence originates in God’s wisdom as an
ordination of reason with respect to the good. And so, we are born into the world
as creatures who naturally occupy a place in that order, and who are naturally
ordered to a final end, a good, that we do not choose. Neither are our
relationships matters of choice; we simply are in certain relationships:
familial relations, relations with our neighbors, membership in a larger
political and civic community, and so on. Justice thus has to do with our right
ordering to the good that we do not determine for ourselves. It is based on a
reality outside of us, in the order of relations in which we inevitably exist.
For a Thomist, then,
rights are not properties of individuals as moral monads. Nor can we find the
source of rights in an abstract definition of human nature, but rather by
considering man as a rational and free creature ordered to God and to the
common good of the hierarchy of communities to which he belongs. This allows us
to see, then, how rights are connected to justice, to teleology, and to the
common good.
In
relation to Justice: Rights are a way of looking at what is due, the ius or
iustum, insofar as it is due to someone who can then seek to have
that “due” vindicated. This is, in Thomistic terms, a “right.” Because of man’s
nature, we can draw certain conclusions about what man is, what man ought to
be, and therefore how we should treat other persons, since they are equal to us
insofar as they are human. Yet rights are not functions of individuals as
individuals, but rather of persons who belong in a hierarchy of ordered wholes
(families, cities, the whole human race, the whole cosmos), each of which has
its own common good.
In
relation to Teleology and the Common Good: Law is teleological. It
is always ordered to the common good, either real or merely apparent.
And rights are likewise teleological: they arm what is required for persons to
be rightly ordered to each other and to the political authority in view of the
common good. us, to respect the rights of another, to give hi m what is due to
him, not only pertains to his private good, but means acting in right
relationship to the order of the whole, to the common good.
Indeed, Aquinas teaches
that man’s ends are not arranged side by side on a horizontal plane, but exist
in an ordered hierarchy: he is ordered to individual goods (like the good of
his biological life), and then to higher and nobler common goods (like the good
life that he shares in a virtuous family, a flourishing and friendly
neighborhood, and a just society), and ultimately to God, the universal common
good of the whole universe. Laws of various kinds direct man toward these
various levels of good. Rights can therefore also be understood as a function
of a just ordering of each person toward the common good.
Note, though, how this
view differs from a typical contemporary theory of rights. In the classical
Thomistic view, the end (the common good) and the ordering of the community to
that end are primary. Rights articulate claims of justice in relation to the
end. Consequently, rights are not absolute or unlimited claims, nor are they
themselves the ultimate foundation of or reason for our political community.
Rather, rights always point to something further and nobler than an individual
or private good: the common good of the whole. This is not to say, of course,
that individual rights must always bow before the demands of the political
authority. To the contrary, Aquinas holds that some rights are a function of
the order of man to a good that is prior to or transcends the political
community (as we saw him argue concerning the right of a parent to care for his
child). But even these rights do not stand on their own; rather, they stand in
virtue of their relation to a good.
Contemporary rights
theorists might object that this classical Thomistic view subordinates the
liberty that individual rights guarantee under the common good in such a way
that those rights will be endangered whenever the government (or the majority)
find them inconvenient. Is this not, they would ask, precisely the reason why
we should arm the primacy of individual rights understood as anterior to
political society and independent of the common good? A complete answer to this
objection would require much longer treatment than can be provided here, but we
can at least identify the confusion about the common good hiding in such
questions. From Aquinas’s perspective, the common good is not something that
competes with the good of individuals, nor is it like other private goods that
are diminished when they are shared (e.g., more people invited to the party
means a smaller slice of cake for each). A common good is precisely the kind of
good that can be shared by many without diminishment, like the good of victory
for a sports team, or the good of justice in a city, or the good of peace among
states. To say that rights stand in relation to a good, then, is not to say
that some kind of alien or hostile “common good” trumps or even destroys the
good of the individual. Rather, the common good is a good for the
individual, a good of a higher and nobler sort in which the individual
participates, and without which it is impossible to have a full measure of
human happiness. Human beings are ordered not only to private goods like food
and shelter but also to common goods like justice, truth, civic friendship, and
peace, and without at least some measure of these common goods, they will
neither flourish nor be truly happy. As Aquinas puts it (paraphrasing
Aristotle’s Politics), the city exists “not only that men might live,
but that they might live well.” at individuals have rights that they can
assert, rights that the positive law should recognize, pertains, therefore, not
only to the private good of individuals, but to the common good of the
community: the “Blessings of Liberty” (as the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution
puts it) should not be thought of as describing a merely private good, the
individual property of discrete individuals, but rather a dimension of the
common good. It is part of the common good that the community be just, that it
recognize what is due to its members, that it be governed by the rule of law,
and that it be composed of free citizens capable of directing their own lives
by their own responsible choices. When the law acknowledges and protects the
just right of a citizen, it is doing something quite different from pork-barrel
spending that hands out material benefits (that is, essentially private goods)
to the favored clients of the ruler. Acknowledging what is due to individuals
is (at least in part) what makes a society just.
On this view, then,
individual rights are not set over against the common good, as if an increase
in the common good necessitated a diminishment of individual liberty. Rather,
that individuals be secure in their liberties as citizens—that they “possess rights”—is
precisely an aspect or dimension of the common good, and the protection of
those rights in law is a means for securing the common good of a just republic.
In all of this, subjective rights are understood as a function of an
overarching order toward a good. To put it another way, rights are important
(or even fundamental and indispensable) precisely because of the overarching
primacy of the common good and the place that each individual has in the order
of the whole.
The question then becomes when can a secular or
Catholic state suppress certain forms of religious expression? In my opinion a
secular state can suppress certain forms of religious expression which go
against the natural law (e.g., idolatry); whereas a Catholic state may suppress
proselytization among Catholic citizens and even hinder the construction of
religious buildings which might undermine the Catholic ethos of the city. As
Daniel J. Castellano notes,
The erection of religious
buildings can be a controversial matter, depending on their specific location
and purpose. If their location or purpose is oriented toward corrupting the
faith of the Catholic majority, a Catholic state might justly impose limits on
such construction, yet at the same time it has a responsibility to allow
religious minorities to acquire adequate facilities for public worship in
proportion to their numbers.
John A. Abbo & Jerome Daniel Hannan, “The
Sacred Canons: A Concise Presentation of the Current Disciplinary Norms of the
Church,” Volume 1 (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1960), 44.
Charles Augustine, A Commentary on the
Code of Canon Law, Book III, Volume IV (St. Louis: B. Herder Book, 1920),
559-560.
Joseph Pohle, The Sacraments: A Dogmatic Treatise
(Volume I), edited by Arthur Pruss (St. Louis, Mo: B. Herder, 1915), 111-113.
John Hogan, “The Art of the Liturgy,” in American Ecclesiastical Review, Volume
13, (Philadelphia, PA: American Ecclesiastical Review Co.. 1895), 323.
Robert Bellarmine, On the Roman Pontiff,
Volume II, Book 4, translated by Ryan Grant. (Post Falls, ID: Mediatrix Press,
2016), 235.
Giovanni
Perone, Praelectiones Theologicae,
T. 3, De Sacramentorum Ritibus, pp. 44-46: 169. [Quotes Sess. VII can. 13] 170.
(Translation by Ryan Grant)
https://www.academia.edu/37099150/Paul_VI_and_Jean_Guitton_on_Archbishop_Marcel_Lefebvre
